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 1 
CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Maddison (2004) shows that China became the world’s fastest-growing economy since 
1990, an achievement that The Economist refers to as the nation’s “great leap forward”.1 Since 
1994, its real GDP per capita grew at a startling average rate of 12.4 percent per year over this 
period, while real fixed investment per capita grew at 14.8 percent per year. From a real 
aggregate GDP of only 542.5 billion US dollars in 1994 to 2.61 trillion US dollars in 2005, 
China quickly ascended to the world’s fourth largest economy in just 11 years, following only 
the U.S., Japan, and Germany. The Central Intelligence Agency (2006) reports that based on 
purchasing power parity, in 2005, with an aggregate GDP of 8.16 trillion US dollars, China 
has even exceeded Japan and ascended to become the world’s third largest economy, trailing 
only the U.S. and the European Union. This represents a remarkable achievement given that, 
based on purchasing power parity, China only ranked No. 10 in the world in 1992.2 Figure 1-1 
and Figure 1-2 illustrate this growth without a pause during this period.  
This rapid growth was accompanied by profound structural reforms. Two of the most 
important structural reforms have occurred in the financial sector and state-owned industrial 
sector. The reform of the financial sector is widely recognized as “a crucial element of a 
                                                        
1 See “The Great Leap Forward”, The Economist, Sep.30, 2004.   
2 The growth rates were calculated from data of China Statistical Yearbook 2005, and the 
aggregate GDP data as well as the rankings are from 
http://www.cbc.ca/story/business/national/2006/01/25/china-060123.html,  
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html and 
http://www.theodora.com/wfb/1992/rankings/gdp_gnp_million_1.html. 
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long-term growth strategy”, while the reform of the state-owned industrial sector is widely 
recognized as one of the core issues in China’s economic reform.3  
This dissertation thus focuses on two important issues in China’s economic 
development and reforms: (1) the relationship between its financial development and 
economic growth; (2) the impact of its share issue privatization on the state-owned industrial 
sector. 
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Figure 1-1: Per Capita Real GDP of China (1994-2004) 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 See, for example, E. S. Prasad’s recent essay “Next Steps for China” in the IMF’s Finance 
and Development, September 2005, and J. Y. Lin et al.’s essay “Competition, Policy Burdens, 
and State-Owned Enterprise Reform” in American Economic Review, May 1998. 
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    Figure 1-2: Per Capita Real Fixed Investment of China (1994-2004) 
 
2. Financial Development and Economic Growth in China 
    Since 1995, China’s financial system developed rapidly, with improvements in both the 
quality and quantity of bank credit. In terms of quality, Chen et al. (2005) assert that “the 
major reform in the banking system came when a Western-style Central Bank Law and 
Commercial Bank Law were enacted in 1995 to establish the foundation of a competitive, 
modern banking system.” The OECD’s most recent Economic Survey of China (2005) points 
out that, “until 1995, banks paid considerable attention to national policies in determining the 
allocation of bank credit…[but] wide ranging reforms have been introduced since then. Banks 
have now started to modernize their lending and risk management practices.” With respect to 
quantity, two major measures of financial depth, the amount of real domestic credit per capita 
grew at an average rate of 19 percent per year from 1995 to 2005, while the ratio of domestic 
credit to GDP rose from 0.92 to 1.60.4 
                                                        
4 Calculated from data from China Statistical Yearbook 2005 and International Financial 
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The financial sector also saw significant restructurings, the most important coinciding 
with the emergence of the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange in 1991. The enactments of the Companies Law in 1993 and the Securities Law in 
1998 formally established “the legal framework for issuance of equity” (OECD 2002). The 
establishment of legal and market infrastructures created conditions conducive to stock market 
development, and the number of firms listed on the exchanges rose from 345 in 1995 to 1379 
by the end of the first quarter of 2005. At the same time, real stock market capitalization per 
capita grew at an average rate of 19 percent per year, the ratio of market capitalization to GDP 
rose from 0.42 to 0.6, and trading volume increased more than 10-fold.5  
Despite rapid growth in quantitative measures of China’s stock markets, however, there is 
widespread suspicion about the quality of these markets. For example, Forbes Magazine (2001) 
has called these markets “China’s $600 billion casino”, Time (2005, Asian Edition) describes 
“China’s market maladies”, The Economist (2005) characterizes the stock markets as 
“marginalized”, BusinessWeek (2005) calls these stock markets “Rickety Bourses.” 6  
More formally, a battery of empirical tests of the efficient market hypothesis conducted 
by Mookerjee and Yu (1999) show that “there are significant inefficiencies present in both 
exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen).” Among these are price distortions resulting from the 
state’s holding of nearly two-thirds of all listed shares. Indeed, when the government attempts 
to sell off blocks of shares for some of their often low-profit or losing state-owned enterprises, 
as it did in May of 2005, the market seems unable to attract the foreign and domestic investors 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Statistics Database. 
5 Calculated from data from China Statistical Yearbook 2005 and the official website of China 
Securities Regulatory Commission: http://www.csrc.gov.cn. 
6 See “China’s $600 billion casino”, Forbes, Oct. 1, 2001; “China’s Market Maladies”, Time, 
Feb. 7, 2005; “China’s Stock Market—A Marginalized Market”, The Economist, Feb. 24, 2005; 
“Raging Growth and Rickety Bourses”, BusinessWeek, Oct. 31, 2005. 
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needed to absorb them without dramatic downward price movements. 7 Another problem 
involves the prevalence of insider trading and fraud. Du and Wei (2004) show, for example, 
that if insider trading in the United States were to increase to levels currently found in China, 
market volatility would rise by 250 basis points. BusinessWeek (2005) reports that, “originally 
designed to enrich the stakeholders of privatized state companies, the bourses have become 
littered with small local companies with suspect financial statements and shares that are sold 
by often-corrupt brokers who allegedly make their money by manipulating prices.”8 
Since it is widely conjectured that, even in the face of these problems, financial sector 
reform is “crucial to China’s sustainable long-term growth”, it is important to sort out 
statistically where the most plausible links between banks, financial markets, and the real 
sector lie over this recent period of rapid change.  
In order to figure out the causal relationship between banks, financial markets, and the 
real sector, I examine quarterly data from 1995-2005 and estimate tri-variate VAR systems 
including a bank credit measure, a stock market development measure and GDP or fixed 
investment for each system. Then I conduct Granger-causality tests. The Granger-causality 
analysis in the VAR systems in the first chapter is to my knowledge the first to explore these 
questions for China in a multivariate time series setting.  
Granger-test results in the first chapter indicate that increases in the size and 
sophistication of China’s banking sector had positive and significant effects on both output and 
fixed investment, yet stock market development did not. The latter result is perhaps surprising 
given that the government intended to use the stock markets to mobilize household savings 
                                                        
7 Zhang et al. (2001), for example, describe the decline in profitability for China’s state-owned 
industrial enterprises between 1978 and 1996. Holz (2003) indicates that “between 1978 and 
1997, losses in industrial SOEs rose twentyfold” (p.vii). 
8 “Raging Growth and Rickety Bourses”, BusinessWeek, Oct. 31, 2005. 
 
 6 
and channel it into capital accumulation, and to bring state-owned enterprises under 
presumably more efficient public monitoring and quasi-private control. On the other hand, 
using a similar empirical approach, Arestis et al. (2001) show that in developed economies 
(US, UK, Japan, Germany, and France), the positive effects of banking sector development on 
economic growth are much greater than those of stock market development. My results show 
that this is also the case for China, a developing country. My results are also consistent with 
the general sentiments of financial professionals in China. For example, Hong Liang, senior 
China economist at Goldman Sachs Group Inc., comments, “it’s not working…The share 
prices don’t tell us anything about China’s impressive macro-expansion.”9 
 
3. Has Share Issue Privatization Worked for China’s State-Owned Industrial Sector? 
The word “privatization” was coined by Peter Drucker and adopted by Margaret 
Thatcher in 1979 as an economic policy in the United Kingdom. 10 Since then, over 100 
countries around the world have implemented privatizations. Kikeri et al. (1992, p. iii) report 
“since 1980, more than 2000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been privatized in 
developing countries, and 6800 worldwide.” Goodman and Loveman (1991) report that, by 
1990, the value of worldwide sales of SOEs had exceeded $185 billion. According to Gibbon 
(2000, p.1), the cumulative value of proceeds raised by privatizing governments exceeded $1 
trillion during the second half of 1999. As Megginson and Netter (2001, p. 321) remark, 
“Privatization is one of the most important elements of the continuing global phenomenon of 
the increasing use of markets to allocate resources.”            
                                                        
9 “Raging Growth and Rickety Bourses”, BusinessWeek, Oct. 31, 2005. 
10 The first public offering of shares in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) was the British 
Petroleum (a 5% stake) in November 1979. Later, the IPOs of the British Telecom (1984), the 
British Gas (1986), and the second public offering of shares of the British Petroleum (1987) 
attracted much attention. 
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Over the past decade, against the above background, one of the most important 
restructurings of the Chinese economy has been its share issue privatization, i.e.，the gradual 
privatization of its inefficient SOEs by issuing equity shares.11 This privatization has attracted 
widespread attention. For example, the Economist (2005) describes it as a “model of reform.”12 
The latest OECD Economic Survey of China (2005) estimates that, in 2003, private companies 
accounted for 63% of China’s business-sector output, while in the 1970s, there were almost no 
private companies in China. BusinessWeek (2005) quotes Chinese economist Gang Fan, “a 
70% share of GDP is now in private hands.” 13 
    The second and third chapters study the causes and effects of share issue privatization in 
China from 1994 to 2003. In order to model the dynamic interactions between the government 
and the SOEs, I construct a Stackleberg model in the second chapter. This model captures the 
main features of Chinese SOEs, and illustrates the “grabbing hand” and “helping hand” aspects 
of government intervention in SOEs. This model unambiguously predicts that, after the control 
rights change from the government to private owners, the former SOEs’ profitability and 
productivity should increase as redundant workers get laid off. These theoretical predictions 
are robust across a wide spectrum of parameter values. It appears that such a theoretical 
framework has yet to appear in the privatization literature. 
In the third chapter, I conduct empirical tests for the theoretical predictions of the second 
chapter. Using two newly available datasets (China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
Database, 2005, and China Private Listed Companies Database, 2004), I conduct univariate 
                                                        
11 Another means of privatization, “voucher privatization” (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 
1994) has been used in former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  
12 The Economist (09/15/2005): “A model of reform.” 
13 The BusinessWeek (08/22/2005): 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_34/b3948478.htm 
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and multivariate tests for 116 privatized listed firms, and the results strongly support the 
hypothesis that “change-of-control matters”, i.e., what really matters is the actual transfer of 
control rights from the State to private owners rather than the IPO, which is used to signal 
privatization in other studies.  
Specifically, I identify the change of the largest shareholder from the State to a private 
owner as “change of control”, the event that defines “privatization.” I find that the average 
time gap between the IPO and the change of control is around 5 years. Since IPOs may not 
transfer a controlling block of shares into private hands, I believe that my measure captures 
better the “defining aspect” of privatization and actually leads to more accurate estimation of 
its effects.  As a result, the “profitability puzzle” (i.e., why did the profitability of China’s 
SOEs deteriorate while the profitability of SOEs in other countries generally improve after 
IPOs?) is solved. This identification strategy is new to empirical investigations in the 
privatization field, which usually use the IPO as the defining event and fail to find significant 
gains to privatization in China’s case. Using this new identification strategy thus sheds some 
light on the “profitability puzzle”: my time-series analysis shows that the privatized firms (i.e., 
those SOEs that have changed control) enjoy higher profitability and productivity after a 
change-of-control than before, the cross-sectional analysis shows that privatized firms enjoy 
higher profitability and productivity than SOEs in the majority of sample years, and the panel 
analysis with fixed effects or random effects reaches similar conclusions. Even after fixing the 
endogeneity problem by using two-stage-least-squares estimation technique, the same 
conclusions still hold. Robustness checks using the small sample of listed firms for which the 
private owners have gained a majority of shares confirm the results obtained from the sample 
of the listed firms for which the private owners become the largest shareholders. An event 
 9 
study of the stock market return around the change-of-control shows that investors seem to 
have optimistic expectations for the change-of-control.  
I then proceed to show that improvements in corporate governance, especially the 
management turnovers associated with changes of control, are significantly linked to better 
firm performance. Specifically, I show that when privatization also involves a new CEO from 
outside the firm, the firm performance is usually better than when the CEO is retained or a 
replacement is found from within the firm. These results regarding the relationship between 
management turnovers and firm performance are consistent with the results of Dyck (1997) in 
the context of Eastern Germany, Barberis et al. (1996) in the context of Russia, and Frydman 
et al. (1999) in the context of Central European transition economies. For example, Barberis et 
al. (1996) show that, “the presence of new owners and new managers raises the likelihood of 
restructuring…the evidence points to the critical role new human capital plays in economic 
transformation.” Frydman et al. (1999) show that, “privatization to outsider, but not insider, 
owners has significant performance effects.” 
  The results of this dissertation have important policy implications: 
     (1) To take full advantage of the under-utilized stock markets, China needs to carry out 
significant improvements of the infrastructure and operations of those markets; 
     (2) The share issue privatization has “worked” in China—it improves firm profitability 
and productivity while reducing excess labor. China should continue its privatization program 
to further improve firm performance.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The passage of time and a steady inflow of more reliable data from China’s financial 
sector now make it possible to examine possible links between financial factors and real 
activity for this transition economy using recent time-series techniques. The methodology is 
useful for evaluating questions of statistical causation within a single country, and offers an 
alternative to cross-country studies where the econometric identification comes primarily from 
between-country variation in the data (e.g., Levine and Zervos 1998; Rousseau and Wachtel 
2000). Given that several recent studies (e.g., Rioja and Valev 2004; Kassimatis and Spyrous 
2001; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996) have argued against a “one-size-fits-all” approach to 
understanding the nexus, turning to single country analyses may add usefully to the 
information set available to those charged with formulating policy. 
This chapter is organized as follows: in part 2, I will briefly review the debate about the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth; in part 3, I will briefly 
review the conventional wisdom of the functions of stock markets in economic growth,; in part 
4, I will discuss China’s financial structure and the purpose of stock market development; in 
part 5, I will discuss the data and the methodology; in part 6, I will discuss the empirical 
results of tri-variate VARs; in part 7, I conclude this chapter by summarizing the results and 
indicating future directions of China’s stock market development. 
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2. Review of Literature: Finance and Growth 
There are controversial views regarding the relationship between finance and growth in 
both theoretical and empirical studies. Some economists argue that finance leads to growth. 
They basically focus on the impact of financial development on capital accumulation and 
technological growth. For example, Bagehot (1873) argues that finance facilitated capital 
mobilization for British Industrial Revolution. Levine (2004) indicates that financial 
intermediaries may reduce the costs of acquiring and processing information and thereby 
improving resource allocation. Schumpeter (1912) argues that well-functioning banks promote 
technological innovation by identifying and funding the most promising entrepreneurs and 
projects. This idea has been pursued by Galetovic (1996), Blackburn and Hung (1998) and 
Morales (2003), etc. On the other hand, Joan Robinson (1952) argues that economic 
development creates demands for particular financial arrangements, and the financial system 
just responds automatically to these demands. So her argument is that finance follows 
economic growth. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) formally model the dynamic interactions 
between finance and growth. They find financial development and economic growth reinforce 
each other. On the other hand, Lucas (1988) argues that the relationship is “badly 
overstressed”, and Murphy et al. (1991) argue the financial sector is merely a rent-seeking 
sector. In order to empirically examine their arguments, King and Levine (1993) and Levine 
and Zervos (1998) estimate cross-country regressions of economic growth on financial 
development indicators, and find that initial financial development level is a good predictor of 
subsequent economic growth. So they conclude that the causality flows from finance to 
growth. 
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However, there are two main weaknesses associated with the cross-country regression 
techniques: 
(1) “One size does not fit all.” As Demetriades and Hussein (1996) indicate, the 
cross-section nature of the technique cannot allow different countries to exhibit different 
patterns of causality, and the notion of the “representative country” in the context of causality 
testing is not sufficiently informative, especially in relation to policy analysis, because it is not 
clear which countries are “representative” and which are not. Therefore, time series analysis is 
needed in order to determine the causality. Demetriads and Hussein (1996) conduct Granger 
causality tests in 16 developing countries and find “little support to the view that finance is a 
leading sector in the process of economic development. There is considerable evidence of 
bi-directionality and some evidence of reverse causation. Causality patterns indeed vary across 
countries.”  Kassimatis and Spyrous (2001) find that equity markets have a role to play only 
in relatively liberalized economies, like Chile and Mexico. In financially repressed economies, 
like India, the equity market does not affect real sector growth. While in regions where the 
nature of the stock market has been speculative, like Taiwan, a negative relationship is 
detected between equity market development and economic development. Rioja and Valev 
(2004) examine a panel of 74 countries and conclude that the relationship between finance and 
growth “varies according to the level of financial development (divided in three regions). In 
the low region (countries with very low levels of financial development), additional 
improvements in financial markets have an uncertain effect on growth. In the intermediate 
region, financial development has a large, positive effect on growth. Finally, in the high region, 
the effect is positive, but smaller.”  
 
 13 
(2) The endogeneity problem. Harris (1997) shows that the endogeneity of variables in 
cross-country regressions regarding the relationship between stock market development and 
economic growth may make the results very misleading.  
Therefore, as Bell and Rousseau (2001) point out, it is important to “study individual 
countries using a diverse set of financial variables for specific period of history to further our 
understanding of the finance-growth nexus.” The rapid growth of China’s real economy and its 
financial sector offers us a good opportunity to examine finance-growth relationship in a 
transition economy, which is characterized by the transition from a central-planned economy 
to a market-oriented economy. Previous studies of financial development in transition 
economies (e.g., Claessens et al. 2000) focus on transition economies in central and eastern 
Europe, while the relationship between China’s financial development and economic 
development, especially its stock market development and economic growth, has seldom been 
empirically examined before. This topic is highly controversial in China. Some economists 
(e.g. Wu, Jinglian (2001), Chief economist of the Development Research Center of the State 
Council) argue, “China’s stock market is a casino. Few participants are really concerned about 
investment. They are only concerned about speculation.”14 While some other economists (e.g. 
Li, Yining (1992), Dean of Business School, Peking University) argues that the stock markets 
will be very important for China’s State-Owned Enterprises reform, one of the most crucial 
reforms in China, and through the successful reform, China will enjoy rapid and sustainable 
economic growth. In view of the controversy in theory and previous empirical studies in other 
developing countries, as well as the controversy about China’s stock market development, this 
chapter is intended to find empirical evidence about the causal role of financial sector in  
 
                                                        
14 See also Forbes (10/01/01):”China’s $600 billion casino”. 
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China’s economic growth, especially the role of stock markets from 1995 to 2005. The 
findings of this chapter will be meaningful for researchers and policy-makers as well. 
 
3. The Conventional Wisdom of the Functions of Stock Market in Economic Growth 
Cho (1986) shows analytically that to achieve efficient resource allocation, credit 
markets need to be supplemented by a well-functioning equity market. This is because, unlike 
bank borrowing, equity finance is not subject to adverse selection and moral hazard in the 
presence of asymmetric information (the adverse selection and moral hazard involved in bank 
borrowing were analyzed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). Boyd and Smith (1998) develops an 
endogenous growth model and shows that a typical pattern of development will be that 
increases in the level of per capita output are associated with a greater volume of equity market 
activity, because equity markets are complements to debt markets. As economies become more 
highly developed, debt and equity markets will become more complementary. The equity 
markets are complementary to debt market because equity markets have their unique functions.  
Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) summarize the important functions of stock markets. I think 
three of them are relevant for China: 
 (1) An equity market provides investors and entrepreneurs with a potential exit 
mechanism, so venture capital investments become more attractive, and technological 
innovations are more active; 
 (2) The provision of liquidity through organized exchanges encourages investors to 
transfer their surpluses from short-term assets to long-term capital market, where the funds can 
provide access to permanent capital to firms to finance large, indivisible projects that enjoy 
substantive scale economies;  
 15 
(3) The existence of a stock market provides important information that improves the 
efficiency of financial intermediation generally. As Levine (2004) indicates, as stock markets 
become larger and more liquid, agents may have greater incentives to spend resources 
researching firms because it is easier to profit from this information by trading in big and 
liquid markets. Empirically, Levine and Zervos (1998) estimate a cross-country regression of 
real per capita GDP growth, capital stock growth, productivity growth, savings rate on the ratio 
of bank credit over GDP, the ratio of stock market capitalization over GDP (size) and/or the 
ratio of stock market trading volume over GDP (liquidity), together with some control 
variables. They show that “financial markets provide important services for growth and that 
stock markets provide different services from banks.” In particular, they find that stock market 
liquidity facilitates long-run growth. Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) use panel VAR technique 
to examine 47 countries from 1980 to 1995, and find that “increases in both the intensity of 
activity in traditional intermediaries and the market value of equity traded on organized 
exchanges have a strong effect on output, while the effects of market capitalization are 
weaker.” 
     On the other hand, some economists indicate some stock markets have their inherent 
weaknesses. For example, Singh (1997) argues that share prices in emerging markets may 
fluctuate more than those in well-developed markets, which has been empirically confirmed 
(e.g. Davis 1995). He argues that the high volatility is a negative feature of a stock market 
because it discourages risk-averse savers and investors, while encourages speculators. He also 
points out that the problem with developing countries’ stock market development is that stock 
market development is not “an evolutionary response to market forces” but is an expansion 
where “governments play a major proactive role”. Therefore, developing countries’ firms may 
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not follow the “pecking order” of corporate finance, which has been empirically confirmed by 
Singh (1995), and the evolution of debt and equity market may not be described by 
endogenous growth models such as Boyd and Smith (1998). Therefore, the research into the 
interaction between stock market development and economic growth in China, a transition 
economy in which government is very proactive in developing its stock market, can yield 
different insights into the relationship between financial development and economic growth. 
 
4. China’s Financial Structure and the Purpose of Stock Market Development 
      China’s financial sector is made up of banks, nonbank financial institutions (e.g., 
People’s Insurance Company of China) and stock markets. At the end of 1990s, China’s 
banking system includes the central bank (People’s Bank of China), the four major 
state-owned commercial banks, three policy banks (State Development Bank, Export and 
Import Bank, Agricultural Development Bank), two commercial banks (Bank of 
Communications, the CITIC Industrial Bank), 12 joint stock banks and the city commercial 
banks (OECD 2002). The banking system used to be the main source of enterprise finance, 
especially for State-Owned Enterprises. But the central government tried to change this 
situation by developing stock markets from the 1980s.  The stock markets experienced 
formative period in the late 1970s, and the emergence of more formal structures (e.g., stock 
exchanges, corporate laws, and regulatory structure) in the early 1990s, and additional reforms 
after the 1997 Asian crisis (OECD 2002). The initial main purposes of developing stock 
markets in China are: 
      (1) To mobilize savings, reduce risks and costs of large stocks of households’ savings 
in the banking system. As Tong (1999) indicates, household savings rise sharply in the 1990s, 
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which was partly caused by the limited choices of personal investments (and partly caused by 
the lack of an effective social security system). The problem with such a high savings rate is: a 
rising inflation may trigger a sudden withdrawal of bank deposits and lead to a liquidity crisis, 
as it happened in 1988, and this will cause a severe decline in long-term investment and will 
slow economic growth. As Lan (1997) indicates, these savings may put pressure on inflation, 
and a high inflation rate will diminish the positive effects of financial development on 
economic growth, as Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) emphasize. Inflation, a real threat to 
economic growth in China, has occurred many times since the start of the reform at the end of 
the 1970s. For example, the consumer price index rose by 18.5% in 1988, the highest for 3 
decades, and it rose by 21.7% in 1994, a new peak. Therefore, the government wanted to find 
new outlets for savings to shift from potential consumption into investment. As a result, stock 
markets were developed so that households had a new type of financial instrument to invest in. 
      (2) As Mookerjee and Yu (1999) indicate, growth in Chinese stock market can be 
traced to the government’s view that well-functioning stock exchanges are crucial if inefficient 
and money-losing medium- and large-scale state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are to be 
successfully restructured. Zhang and Zhang (2001) show, in 1996, total losses by industrial 
SOEs were 79 billion yuan (Chinese currency), while the losses in 1978 were only 4.2 billion 
yuan, with an annualized growth rate of 17.7%. These losses were absorbed mainly by 
government subsidies and loans from the state banks. An efficient stock market will attract 
both domestic and foreign sources of funds and technology and allow the government to wean 
money-losing SOEs off subsidized loans from the state sector and expose them to the 
discipline of the market. Chinese authorities are using equity markets to change the ownership 
structure, improve the corporate governance of SOEs and enhance their operational efficiency, 
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thus hoping that the stock markets would contribute to economic growth. For example, the 
need to prepare a prospectus introduced broadly accepted international accounting practices, 
and emphasized profitability performance. The Chinese authorities have also adopted a 
rigorous disclosure policy for information disclosure. In 1998, China promulgated China 
Securities Law15, which is an important component of the regulatory structure of the stock 
market, and is a way to discipline SOE’s operations.     
      Despite the original good intention of the Chinese government to develop its stock 
markets, China’s stock markets are plagued with serious problems. A battery of empirical tests 
of the efficient market hypothesis conducted by Mookerjee and Yu (1999) show that “there are 
significant inefficiencies present in both exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen).” Among these 
are price distortions resulting from the state’s holding of nearly two-thirds of all listed shares. 
Indeed, when the government attempts to sell off blocks of shares for some of their often 
low-profit or losing state-owned enterprises, as it did in May of 2005, the market seems unable 
to attract the foreign and domestic investors needed to absorb them without dramatic 
downward price movements. 16 Another problem involves the prevalence of insider trading 
and fraud. Du and Wei (2004) show, for example, that if insider trading in the United States 
were to increase to levels currently found in China, market volatility would rise by 250 basis 
points. Therefore, a formal econometric investigation is needed to determine whether the stock 
markets have contributed to economic growth in China during the past decade. 
 
     
                                                        
15 The law is available at: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/CSRCSite/eng/elaws.htm. 
16 Zhang et al. (2001), for example, describe the decline in profitability for China’s 
state-owned industrial enterprises between 1978 and 1996. Holz (2003) indicates that 
“between 1978 and 1997, losses in industrial SOEs rose twentyfold” (p.vii). 
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5. Data and Methodology 
The variables that I consider are: 1) banking sector development as measured by the 
value of domestic credit; (2) stock market development as measured by size (total market 
value of outstanding shares or the number of listed firms) and activity (total market value of 
shares traded); (3) real economic performance as measured by the value of GDP or fixed 
investment. I use quarterly data from 1995:Q1 through 2005:Q1. Investment data are from 
China Monthly Statistics, GDP is from the Economist Intelligence Unit Database, domestic 
credit is from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and population and the consumer 
price index are from the China Statistical Yearbook 2005. The quarterly stock market data for 
1998-2005 are from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (www.csrc.gov.cn), and I 
join these with data for 1995-1997 from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Co. Ltd. I transform 
all variables into real per capita terms, take logs, and then adjust investment, GDP, and 
domestic credit for seasonality by regressing each on quarterly dummy variables. 
To evaluate possible causal links between banks, stock markets, and real activity, I 
follow Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) and estimate a series of trivariate vector autoregressive 
(VAR) systems of the form: 
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     where x1 is fixed investment or GDP, x2 is domestic credit, and x3 is one of my measures 
of stock market development.              
Before proceeding with the estimation, however, it is important to ensure that test 
statistics for block exclusion (i.e., Granger-causality) in these systems conform to standard 
distributions. This amounts to determining whether the variables in the systems that I consider 
have unit roots, and if so, whether they are cointegrated. If there is a single cointegrating 
vector, Sims et al. (1990) show in the trivariate case that the asymptotic distribution of the 
Wald test for Granger-causality is chi-square, making levels VARs appropriate for inference. 
If there are possibly two cointegrating vectors, Toda and Yamamoto (1995) show that tests for 
block exclusion remain chi-square distributed when an additional lag is added to the VAR 
structure but not used when constructing the Granger causality test.  
 
6. Econometric Findings 
When I compute augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for all of our series using specifications 
with a constant, trend, and three lag differences, I cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root for any of the data in levels with the ADF test, but can easily reject it for the data in first 
differences with the ADF or PP test (see Table 2-1).17 I thus consider it reasonable to proceed 
under the assumption that all data series are integrated of order one.  
Table 2-2 shows the trace and maximum eigenvalue test statistics from Johansen (1991) 
cointegration tests for each of the six VAR systems that I consider. A series of nested 
                                                        
17 The Akaike information criterion selects two lags in all cases. I use three lags in the test 
regressions, however, since Schwert (1989) has shown that ADF tests tend to overreject in 
small samples when the AIC is used and that the loss of power from the extra lag is generally 
small. Phillips and Perron (1988) tests for unit roots led to similar inferences regarding the 
non-stationarity of my data. 
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likelihood ratio tests select a lag order of three for each system, and trends in the data suggest 
the inclusion of an unrestricted intercept in the model. The tests are consistent with a single 
cointegrating relationship in the three systems that include GDP as the measure of real activity, 
while there is evidence of two cointegrating relationships in the three systems that replace 
GDP with fixed investment. 
 
Table 2-1: ADF and PP statistics for macroeconomic indicators and measures of financial 
development 
 
 ADF      PP     
 Level   1st difference  Level 1st difference 
        
GDP -2.74  -3.88**  -5.06*** -10.69*** 
INV -2.45  -5.10***  -10.73*** -24.54*** 
Credit -3.02  -2.82  -1.88 -5.47*** 
CAP -2.03  -4.13**  -0.51 -6.03*** 
Firm -3.02  -3.78**  -0.97 -3.56** 
Trade -2.58   -3.62**   -3.45* -9.05*** 
 
 
Notes: (1) GDP, INV, Credit, CAP, Firm and Trade refer to GDP, fixed investment, domestic 
credit, stock market capitalization, the number of listed firms, and the stock market trading 
volume respectively. All variables except the number of firms are in log per capita real terms. 
The number of listed firms is normalized by using the number per billion persons. (2) *, ** 
and *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
 
 
Based on the Johansen tests, I proceed to estimate VARs in levels for the systems with GDP 
using three lags and compute tests for the Granger non-causality on each variable block. The 
results appear in Table 2-3. In all three systems (i.e., regardless of the stock market indicator 
chosen), my measure of banking development Granger-causes GDP at less than the five 
percent level with a positive sum of the regression coefficients, while GDP does not 
Granger-cause banking development. At the same time, the measures of stock market  
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Table 2-2: Johansen test statistics for cointegration 
 
System    m Eigenvalue   Trace     
(K=3)    r=0 r<=1   r=0 r<=1 r<=2 
GDP, Credit, and        
        
Cap   23.14* 10.74  35.77* 12.63 1.89 
        
Firm   25.00* 13.38  40.95* 15.96* 2.58 
        
Trade   21.15* 7.94  31.65* 10.49 2.55 
         
INV, Credit and        
        
Cap   19.97* 15.53*  35.54* 15.57* 0.04 
        
Firm   22.86* 16.22*  39.73* 16.87* 0.65 
        
Trade    21.05* 15.68* 37.87* 16.81* 1.13 
 
Note: The columns labeled r=0 test a null of no cointegration, while the r<=1(r<=2) columns 
test a null of at least one (two) cointegrating vectors. * represents statistical significance at the 
5 percent level, with critical values from Osterwald-Lenum (1992), Table 1. 
 
 
 
development do not Granger-cause growth, though there is evidence of small positive effects 
of economic growth to stock market development. 
I report results for the three VARs with fixed investment as the measure of real activity in 
Table 2-4. Since there are possibly two cointegrating vectors, I apply the Toda-Yamamoto 
(1995) technique and use four lags in the VARs. Similar to the systems with GDP, I find that 
domestic credit Granger-causes investment, and that there is no feedback from investment to 
domestic credit. At the same time, there is no apparent relationship from any of the stock 
market indicators to investment.  
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Table 2-3: VAR estimates for the systems with GDP, Credit and stock market indicators 
 
 
Note: The VAR systems include GDP, domestic credit (Credit), and a stock market 
development indicator listed at the left, all in log real per capita terms. The equation numbers 
correspond to those in the text, with (1a), (1b) and (1c) employing investment, credit and stock 
market development indicators as the respective dependent variables. It reports the sum of the 
regression coefficients on GDP, Credit, and the stock market development indicator in levels 
VARs with the significance level of the F-test for Granger non-causality in parenthesis. Each 
panel also reports the R2 statistics. The VARs use three (K) lags of each variable.  
 
 
Some of the more interesting effects between domestic credit and real activity are traced 
out with the impulse responses in Figures 2-1, 2-2 and 2-3. Figure 2-1 indicates that a one 
percent shock to the orthogonalized innovation to domestic credit raises per capita output by 
nearly 0.6 percent after six quarters, with the lower two-standard-error band crossing the 
horizontal axis after one year. Figure 2-2 reports similar results. Panel (a) of Figure 2-3 shows 
that a one percent shock to credit raises per capita investment by about 1.4 percent after two 
quarters, and that these effects are persistent. Figure 2-1 also shows that one percent shock to 
             
Stock market 
indicator  
Levels VAR Granger 
tests     
K=3  Eq. GDP Credit Stock R2 
       
Cap (1a) 0.466(0.012) 0.295(0.006) 0.036(0.264) 0.977
  (1b) -0.113(0.867) 1.024(0.000) 0.011(0.465) 0.996
  (1c) 0.719(0.167) 0.341(0.409) 0.866(0.000) 0.968
       
Firm (1a) 0.426(0.019) 0.361(0.002) 0.124(0.129) 0.979
  (1b) -0.108(0.935) 1.030(0.000) 0.015(0.853) 0.995
  (1c) 0.030(0.104) 0.067(0.057) 0.881(0.000) 0.997
       
Trade (1a) 0.485(0.011) 0.244(0.022) 0.008(0.931) 0.974
  (1b) -0.073(0.910) 1.010(0.000) 0.013(0.737) 0.995
   (1c) 2.598(0.076) 1.054(0.721) 0.398(0.223) 0.552
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output does not generate responses in domestic credit for which the two-standard-error bands 
cross the horizontal axes. 
 
Table 2-4: VAR estimates for the systems with Investment, domestic credit and stock 
market indicators 
              
Stock market 
indicator  
Levels VAR Granger 
tests    
K=3  Eq. Investment Credit Stock R2 
       
Cap (1a) 0.586(0.521) 0.600(0.012) 0.066(0.812) 0.957 
 (1b) 0.084(0.805) 0.855(0.000) 0.005(0.514) 0.995 
  (1c) 0.132(0.613) 0.210(0.870) 0.896(0.000) 0.971 
       
Firm (1a) 0.461(0.291) 0.768(0.007) 0.132(0.245) 0.959 
 (1b) 0.084(0.830) 0.862(0.000) 0.003(0.847) 0.995 
  (1c) -0.006(0.635) 0.046(0.127) 0.908(0.000) 0.995 
       
Trade (1a) 0.591(0.375) 0.534(0.004) 0.047(0.239) 0.960 
 (1b) 0.075(0.824) 0.884(0.000) 0.013(0.754) 0.995 
  (1c) -0.346(0.380) 0.541(0.748) 0.506(0.055) 0.408 
 
 
 
 
Note: The VAR systems include fixed investment, domestic credit (Credit), and a stock market 
development indicator listed at the left, all in log real per capita terms. The equation numbers 
correspond to those in the text, with (1a), (1b) and (1c) employing investment, credit and stock 
market development indicators as the respective dependent variables. It reports the sum of the 
regression coefficients on GDP, Credit, and the stock market development indicator in levels 
VARs with the significance level of the F-test for Granger non-causality in parenthesis. Each 
panel also reports the R2 statistics. The VARs use three (K) lags of each variable. 
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Figure 2-1: Impulse responses to one-standard-deviation shocks in the system
(GDP, Credit, stock market capitalization); the dotted lines are the
two-standard-error bands 
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(a) The system (GDP, Credit, the number of listed firms) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Impulse responses to one-standard-deviation shocks in the systems; the 
dotted lines are the two-standard-error bands 
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(a) The system (Fixed Investment, Credit, stock market capitalization) 
 
 
 
(b)The system (Fixed Investment, Credit, the number of listed firms) 
 
 
 
(c) The system (Fixed Investment, Credit, stock market trading volume) 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Impulse responses to one-standard-deviation shocks in the systems; the 
dotted lines are the two-standard-error bands 
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7. Summary of Chapter 
Statistical evidence using data for 1995-2005 indicates that increases in the size and 
sophistication of China’s banking sector had positive and significant effects on both output and 
fixed investment, yet stock market development did not. The latter result is perhaps surprising 
given that the government intended to use the stock markets to mobilize household savings 
and channel it into capital accumulation, and to bring state-owned enterprises under 
presumably more efficient public monitoring and quasi-private control. On the other hand, 
using a similar empirical approach, Arestis et al. (2001) show that in developed economies 
(US, UK, Japan, Germany, and France), the positive effects of banking sector development on 
economic growth are much greater than those of stock market development. My results show 
that this is also the case for China, a developing country. Future research of this type for other 
countries might shed important light on the types of economic environments in which this 
finding might hold more generally.  
The results from this chapter imply that China has under-utilized its stock markets. In 
order to fully take advantage of the stock markets to promote economic growth, China needs 
to improve the liquidity of its stock markets by gradually selling off its non-tradable state 
shares, and to strictly enforce laws and regulations to stop widespread fraud and insider 
trading.     
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
SHARE ISSUE PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA: THEORY 
 
 
      “China is accelerating the privatization of tens of thousands of state-owned businesses 
that once served as pillars of Communist Party rule, and has decided to let foreign and private 
investors buy majority stakes in large enterprises the government had previously refused to 
sell, according to Chinese officials and researchers.” 
                                                                                         
--Washington Post, November 12, 2003 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Douglass North (1991) argues that institutions evolve to exploit economic gains. 
Ownership structure is an essential component of economic and political institutions. It is 
therefore an important topic for academic explorations as well as policy makings. The 
large-scale privatization wave around the world since 1979 represents an unprecedented 
change of ownership of resources, a shift of the major player from the State to the market in 
many transition economies. Since 1979, over 100 developing and developed countries around 
the world have implemented privatizations. According to Gibbon (2000, p.1), the cumulative 
value of proceeds raised by privatizing governments exceeded $1 trillion during the second 
half of 1999. This large-scale institutional change will greatly shape the economic, political 
and cultural landscapes of the world in the 21st century.  
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     Two methods of privatization have been used during the past two decades. The former 
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries have used “voucher privatization”, a 
privatization method where citizens are given or can inexpensively buy a book of vouchers 
that represent potential shares in any state-owned company. The “voucher privatization” is a 
means of quick mass privatization. On the other hand, China and other transition economies 
have adopted “share issue privatization”, i.e., to privatize their state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
by issuing equity shares. This is a more gradual and incremental approach. By far, the largest 
fraction of total proceeds raised by privatizing governments has been collected through “share 
issue privatization.” 
     This large-scale worldwide privatization wave since 1979 has naturally attracted great 
attention from not only policy makers, but also economists around the world. Since 1994, four 
papers on the effects of privatization on firm performance have appeared in the Journal of 
Finance (Megginson et al. 1994, Boubakri and Cosset 1998, D’Souza and Megginson 1999, 
Gupta 2005), one paper on the effects of privatization on firm stock returns has appeared in the 
Journal of Finance (Dewenter and Malatesta 1997), one paper on the relative efficiency of 
SOEs and private firms has been published in the American Economic Review (Dewenter and 
Malatesta 2001), two papers on the effects of privatization on firm performance in Mexico and 
Central European countries have been published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (La 
Porta et al. 1999 and Frydman et al. 1999), and one paper on the effects of privatization on 
firm performance in Russia has been published in the Journal of Political Economy (Barberis 
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et al. 1996). One paper on the effects of privatization on firm performance in China has been 
published in the Journal of Financial Economics (Sun and Tong, 2003). 
     Despite the extensive empirical evidence of positive effects of privatization on firm 
performance, there are surprisingly scarce theoretical models for this topic. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994)’s Quarterly Journal of Economics paper represents one of the first efforts to 
analyze the effects of privatization through a rigorous game-theoretical model. Their model 
relies heavily on the existence of subsidies and bribes between the government and firms in a 
Nash-bargaining game between them. Though elegant, this model is inherently hard to test 
empirically due to the unobservability of bribe data. The results of their model are also 
sensitive to parameter values. Therefore, my purpose in this chapter is to establish a realistic 
theoretical model that can generate results consistent with the empirical evidence of positive 
effects of privatization on firm performance. I also intend to construct a model that can 
generate robust predictions. I hope such an effort will pave a new avenue for theoretical 
research in the privatization field. 
     This chapter is organized as follows: section 2 will introduce the main theoretical 
arguments for privatization, and briefly discuss the history of China’s privatization and SOE 
reforms, section 3 will develop a simple theoretical model, which is a Stackleberg game 
between the government and the firms, and section 4 concludes.  
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2. Background 
Why do so many developed and developing countries privatize SOEs? After all, as 
Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva (1998) show, under assumptions of perfect competition, no 
externalities, complete contracts and low information costs, ownership does not matter for firm 
performance. However, in the presence of market failures and externalities, perfect 
competition is no longer a valid assumption, so the SOEs emerge as instruments capable of 
curing market failures by implementing pricing policies that take account of social marginal 
costs (“social view”) (Shapiro and Willig 1990).  
     Despite the potential gains from curing the market failures, SOEs suffer from low 
efficiency. The current theoretical literature in privatization holds that the ultimate sources of 
inefficiencies of SOEs are the incompleteness of contracts and increasing information costs, as 
economies grow more complex and interdependent. These sources of inefficiencies of SOEs 
lead to the “agency view”. Two perspectives within the “agency view” have been developed: 
     (1) The “managerial view”, which argues that SOE managers are not properly monitored 
and therefore the incentives for efficiency are weak (Vickers and Yarrow 1998). Specifically, 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) argue that it is difficult for SOEs to properly monitor their managers 
because there is neither an individual owner with strong incentives to monitor managers nor a 
public share price to provide information about manager actions as judged by market 
participants. Further, the disciplinary role of takeovers (Scharfstein 1988) does not exist at all; 
(2) The “political view”, which argues that political interference in the SOEs leads to 
distortions in objectives and operational constraints. For example, political interference might 
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encourage management to support full employment policies in an attempt to gain political 
support at the expense of profit maximization. The constraints take the form of “soft budget 
constraints” that end up being non-binding due to persistent bailouts of the State (Kornai 
1979). 18 These distortions result in excess employment (Shleifer and Vishny 1994, Boycko 
et al. 1996), employment of politically connected people rather than the best-qualified people 
(Krueger 1990), poor choices of product and location, over-investment and other 
inefficiencies. 19 
      The inefficiencies of SOEs apparently motivated China’s economic reform since 1978, 
the core of which has been SOE reform. This is because: 
(1) SOEs are an important component of China’s economy. As Lin et al. (1998) show, 
even after 18 years of reform, in 1996 SOEs still employed 57.4% of urban workers and 
possessed 52.2% of total investment in industrial fixed assets; 
(2) SOEs in China have problems such as lack of management incentives (Mi and 
Wang 2000) and heavy policy burdens. In this second context, Lin et al. (1998) argue that 
SOEs in China assume too many social-welfare functions, which did more harm than good to 
SOEs’ performance.            
      In the 1980s, and against a background of global privatization, China did not privatize 
much, largely because of ideological concerns. Instead, it decided to consolidate enterprise 
                                                        
18 Berglof and Roland (1998) and Frydman et al.(2000) show that soft budget constraints are a 
major source of inefficiency in SOEs, Lin (1999) shows this is exactly the case in China, and 
Bai and Wang (1999) show that soft budget constraints result in inefficient resource allocation. 
19 See, for example, the “Question of China” part of the article by the American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research (1997): “two new paradigms” at 
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.8072/pub_detail.asp. 
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property rights at the municipal government level and to adopt a “new enterprise governance 
structure that stressed enterprise autonomy and incentives.” (Li 1997, p. 1081). Specifically, 
China’s SOE reform from 1978 to 1992 can be divided into three stages:  
      Stage 1: 1979--1983, China implemented a policy of administrative decentralization 
and profit retention. As a result, SOEs were allowed to retain some proportion of their profits 
so that there were incentives to improve efficiency. 
      Stage 2: 1984--1987, the government no longer directly funded SOE capital 
investments. Instead, SOEs had to borrow from banks. The government wanted to discipline 
SOEs’ behavior by hardening their budgets. But in fact, this did not succeed. Because the 
lending banks were also state-owned, they lacked the incentive to monitor the SOEs. As a 
result, the budget constraints of SOEs were still “soft”. Especially, the SOEs could still get 
“policy lending” from state-owned banks at preferential interest rates. 
      Stage 3: 1988--1992, reform focused on the separation of government ownership from 
control of SOEs’ operations by implementing the “Contract Responsibility System.” This gave 
managers more incentives to maximize profits. Groves et al. (1995) show that Chinese 
managers’ total compensation was positively related to both firm profits and sales, but after a 
reform contract, the correlation between total compensation and profits increased while the 
correlation between total compensation and sales decreased. This implies that the main 
performance measure had changed from sales (the main performance measure in a planned 
economy) to profits (the main performance measure in a market economy). However, because 
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SOEs were still not fully responsible for their losses, the “soft budget constraints” still 
operated at this stage.  
     Therefore, from the beginning of China’s reforms, there have always been two effects. 
The first effect is the “convergence-of-interests effect”, which means that as the managers of 
SOEs get more autonomy (e.g., profit retention) their interests become more aligned with the 
interests of the firm and their behavior becomes more consistent with the goals of profit 
maximization and productivity enhancement. In other words, the “managerial view” of the 
source of inefficiency of SOEs is no longer a serious concern. For example, Groves et al. 
(1994) shows that the productivity of SOEs increased with increases in bonus payments and in 
the number of contract workers. On the other hand, the second “political-intervention effect” 
still exists, so the “political view” of the source of inefficiency of SOEs still applies. This is 
because, as the ultimate owner of SOEs, the State is responsible for not only the performance 
(e.g., profitability and productivity) of SOEs but also the social-welfare functions of them 
(e.g., heavy burdens of retirement pensions, housing, medical cares and redundant workers). 
This tends to worsen firms’ performance. For example, Jefferson (1998) argues that “the SOE 
is a kind of impure public good with clear externality and public-policy implications. 
Nonexcludability and nondiminishability, properties of a public good that are inherent in the 
classic SOE, create externalities that impair economy-wide economic efficiency.” (p. 428) As 
a result, even if all reform measures were fully implemented, as long as the ownership 
structure did not change, the negative “political-intervention effect” would not be mitigated.  
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     In the 1980s, it seemed that the positive “convergence-of-interests” effect dominated the 
negative “political-intervention effect”. For example, Li (1997)’s study of a panel of 272 
Chinese SOEs between 1980 and 1989 shows that there were marked improvements in the 
marginal productivity of factors and in TFP. However, at the beginning of the 1990s, the 
negative “political intervention effect” seemed to begin to dominate. Indeed, Holz (2003) 
shows that in 1990, industrial SOEs in only 3 of the 30 major industrial sectors were running 
aggregate losses; yet by 1997 there were aggregate losses in 25 of the then 39 sectors (p. vii). 
A briefing of the National Center for Policy Analysis (1997) shows that about half of China's 
118,000 SOEs lost money in 1996—up from one-third in 1995. Public-sector industries 
consumed some 75 percent of domestic credit, and at least 20 percent of bank loans were 
non-performing.20 It was against this background did the Chinese government begin to 
seriously consider privatization as a way to improve the performances of its SOEs—the only 
way to mitigate the “political intervention effect”.  
In order to privatize SOEs, China established two stock exchanges in 1990 and 1991, 
and the growth of China’s stock markets has been fast since then. 21 The development of stock 
markets greatly facilitated the share issue privatization in China. The average proportion of 
                                                        
20 http://www.ncpa.org/pd/pdint173.html 
21 During the initial phases of the stock market development, China did not claim to aim at 
privatization. In 1993, the Communist Party approved the creation of a “modern enterprise 
system”, the core of which was the modern corporation limited by shares. For more details, see 
http://english.people.com.cn/english/200010/16/eng20001016_52748.html. 
Then, China implemented de facto share issue privatization without official recognition. In 
1997, Ex-President Zemin Jiang announced the policy of significant ownership diversification 
of the state sector through complete or partial divestiture of small and medium-sized SOEs. 
See “Jiang urges China move closer to capitalism” at 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9709/12/china. 
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state shares in total shares for listed SOEs declined from 1994 to 2003. Jefferson et al.’s 
(2003) study of a panel of 22000 Chinese large- and medium-size enterprises from 1994 to 
1999 shows a “rapidly diversifying ownership structure in which the role of the state is 
steadily retreating.” (p. 89) 
  
3. A Simple Theoretical Model 
     To formally study the causes and effects of China’s share issue privatization, I set up a 
two-period Stackleberg game between the government and the firm to capture the strategic 
interactions between them. In the first period, the government sets its optimal ownership in the 
firm. The government’s objective function is a weighted average of two objectives: (1) an 
employment objective; (2) a revenue objective. The relative weight of these two objectives is 
given by c. The cost of government intervention is g(a)K, where a is the government’s 
ownership in the firm, as measured by the proportion of its shares in the firm’s total shares and 
g(a) is the capital subsidy rate. I assume that the capital subsidy rate g(a) is an increasing 
function of a because the higher the fraction of ownership in the firm, the more capital subsidy 
the government provides it. On the other hand, as a result of owning fraction a of the firm, the 
government claims a proportion a of the firm’s total profits. For purely private firms, a=0, 
while for purely state-owned enterprises, a=1. For firms with mixed-ownership, )1,0(∈a .  
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     Specifically, the government’s maximization problem is to choose its optimal ownership 
in the firm to maximize the utility of the government policy-maker:   
     KagcLKagrwLLAKatLRUg
a
)(]))(()[(),(max −+−−−+= βα . 
where R is government revenue (the first part of the objective function), and L is employment. 
A and K represent TFP and capital. w and r stand for wage and financial market interest rate. 
g(a) is the capital subsidy rate, and t is the profit tax rate applied to all firms irrespective of 
their ownership structures. For simplicity, since the government owns fraction a of the firm, I 
assume that the government shares exactly the fraction a of the capital cost, which means 
that arag =)( . I assume that w=r=1, t=0, 10 <+< βα , c>0. 22  The government’s 
maximization problem becomes:  
     aKcLKaLLAKaLRU g
a
−+−−−= ])1([),(max βα . 
In the second period, given the ownership structure of the firm, the firm manager 
maximizes the weighted average of two objectives: profit and employment. This “multitask” 
objective is consistent with Dong and Putterman (2003) and Bai et al. (2000). For example, 
Dong and Putterman (2003) argue, “the governments, especially in transition economies, often 
use state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to pursue non-financial objectives and to finance the 
resulting social burdens with subsidies and policy loans.” (p.110). Bai et al. (2000) argue that, 
“during transition, maintaining employment and providing social safety net to the unemployed 
                                                        
22 The specific values of these parameters are not the concern of this model. 
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are important to social stability…because independent institutions for social safety are lacking 
and firms with strong profit incentives have little incentive to promote social stability due to its 
public-good nature, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are needed to continue their role in 
providing social welfare.” (p. 716) 
     Specifically, the firm’s maximization problem is to choose capital and labor to 
maximize the utility of the firm manager: 
     LabKagrwLLAKatLU fLK )(]))(()[1(),(max, +−−−−−=
βαπ . 
where π is the net profit (the first part of the objective function), and b(a) is the firm 
manager’s weight on employment objective. It is reasonable to assume that the firm manager’s 
weight on employment is positively correlated with the government ownership in the firm. The 
more the government owns the firm and controls its operations, the more the firm manager 
serves as a politician rather than a businessman, and the more weight the firm manager puts on 
employment in the utility function. In order to get a closed-form solution, I assume a specific 
functional form of b(a):b(a)=na, where n>0, and n is named the “employment preference 
multiplier”. For simplicity, I assume w=r=1,t=0, 10 <+< βα , arag =)( , and the firm 
manager’s maximization problem becomes: 
     naLKaLLAKaLU fLK +−−−−= ])1()[1(),(max,
βαπ . 
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     The above theoretical setup is well supported by the realities in China. It is an 
illustration of the “grabbing hand” (extraction of the profits, a) and the “helping hand” 
(preferential interest rate r-g(a)) of the government. 23 
     Next, let us carefully examine the features of this model:  
     (1) The sequential setup of the game fully reflects the feature of state-dominance of the 
Chinese economy. The government explicitly sets the interest rates of the State-owned banks 
and the profit extraction rate. It implicitly sets its relative weights on the revenue objective 
(“efficiency”) and the employment objective (“social stability”). These weights vary with time, 
reflecting the government’s changing concerns in different periods. For example, when 
unemployment and social tensions are high, the government tends to put higher relative weight 
on social stability. For example, a China Daily report (2003) says, “The top priority for the 
Chinese Government is tilting towards job creation as soaring unemployment threatens to 
undermine the country's economic growth and even social stability… Economist Hu Angang, 
director of the China Study Center with Tsinghua University, said the nation ‘is facing the 
world's biggest battle against unemployment. The issue of employment will pose the biggest 
challenge to our country's economic development in the early 21st century. Generating more 
job opportunities should become the top goal of both the central government and local 
governments, and the employment policy should be placed highest among all economic and 
social policies’.” 
 
                                                        
23 The “grabbing hand” and “helping hand” of government functions were first used by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1999) in a different setting. Here I borrow from their terminology.  
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    (2) The “grabbing hand” (profit extraction) is a defining feature of the SOEs. For 
example, Dong and Putterman (2003) show that, “in 1995, SOEs in industry and other sectors 
produced about 44% of GDP, but contributed 71% of national fiscal revenue.” (p. 112) This 
implies that SOEs face higher effective tax rates than private firms. 
    (3) The preferential interest rate (r-g(a)) for SOEs in China is widely recognized. All 
major banks are state-owned in China. The Chinese government instructs these banks to make 
loans to SOEs at preferential interest rates (“policy lending”). Cull and Xu (2003) observe that, 
“policy lending remained a defining characteristic of the Chinese financial system” (p.539). 24 
Their empirical results show that, “By 1994, direct government transfers had nearly 
disappeared in our sample. The responsibility to bail out poorly performing SOEs must have 
been assumed increasingly by banks.”(p. 543) The inefficiency of the “policy lending” will be 
neatly illustrated by the three propositions to be discussed below. Specifically, Propositions 1, 
2 and 3 show that the higher the government ownership (a is higher), the more preferential the 
interest rate (g(a) is higher and r-g(a) is lower), but the less profitable and productive the 
firms. This has been confirmed by an Ernst & Young report (2003): “in 2002, the 
non-performing loans of Chinese banks amounted to a staggering US$500 billion, a result of 
over 40 years of extensive policy lending” (p.4). The preferential interest rate for SOEs also 
exists in other countries. For example, Sapienza (2004) shows that, in Italy, “the stronger the 
political party in the area where the bank is lending, the lower are the interest rates 
charged…state-owned banks serve as a mechanism to supply political patronage.” (p.357). 
                                                        
24 The existence of preferential interest rates for “policy lending” has been confirmed by an 
official of the China Banking Regulatory Commission in an interview with the author. 
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     (4) The employment objective b(a)L of the firm manager is consistent with empirical 
evidence. Chang and Wong (2004) show that, among their sample of 483 firms listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange at the end of 1999, “about 56% of them still maintain formal ties 
with local governments and ministries, with the latter acting as the firms’ administrative 
superiors…and managers’ decision making has been subject to the control of the local party 
committees since the early 1950s. The promulgation of the Company Law in 1993 did not 
eliminate the influence over firms’ decision making by local party committees.”(p. 621) The 
government wants to keep social stability by maintaining a low unemployment rate, so the 
more the government owns a firm (a is higher), the more weight the firm manager will put on 
the employment objective in the utility function (b(a) is higher). 
   The model generates the following theoretical predictions: 25 
 
PROPOSITION 1: The labor productivity of the firm, as measured by sales per employee (P1,) 
is negatively affected by government ownership: 0
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PROPOSITION 2: The labor productivity of the firm, as measured by profits per employee 
(P2,) is negatively affected by government ownership: 0
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PROPOSITION 3: The profitability of the firm, as measured by return on sales (ROS), is 
negative affected by government ownership: 0
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25 See the appendix for the proofs of these propositions. 
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   The above three propositions lead directly to the following lemma: 
 
LEMMA 1: A change of control of the firm from the government to a private owner lowers 
government ownership in the firm and increases profitability and productivity as a result. 
 
    These results are driven by the employment objective in the firm manager’s utility 
function, a defining feature of firms with mixed-ownership in China and other transition 
economies. As propositions 1, 2 and 3 show, profitability and productivity will not be affected 
by government ownership if the “employment preference multiplier” n=0. As long as n>0, we 
have the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 4: For any given government ownership, employment rises as the 
“employment preference multiplier” n increases. Profitability and productivity fall as n 
increases. In other words, for a given government ownership, the more weight the firm 
manager puts on employment, the more redundant workers are kept on the job and the lower 
profitability and productivity ensue. 
 
    It is easy to see the intuition behind Proposition 4: in the firm manager’s utility function, 
for any given level of government ownership (a), if the employment multiplier n is higher, 
then the weight on employment (na) is higher. Therefore, the firm manager will care more 
about employment than profit. This causes the manager to “over-employ”. As a result, 
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employment is over its optimal level for profit maximization, resulting in redundant workers. 
The existence of these redundant workers lowers the firm’s productivity and profitability. 
Excess labor is widely recognized as a persistent problem of inefficient SOEs. 26 A report of 
OECD (2000) on China estimates that, “surplus workers in SOE amounted to at least 20 
million, and perhaps as many as 35 million, at the end of 1996. These figures represent 
between one-fifth and one-third of the total SOE workforce, and between 10% and 17% of 
total urban employment. Nearly all SOE industry segments have substantial amounts of excess 
workers.” (p. 37)             
    Propositions 1, 2, 3, 4 and Lemma 1 are supported by direct empirical evidence in chapter 
4 of this dissertation. They are also consistent with the results from Chang and Wong (2004): 
“the decision-making power of local party committees relative to managers is associated 
negatively with firm performance.”27 (p. 617).  
 
PROPOSITION 5: The optimal degree of government ownership falls when the share of 
capital in the production function ( )α rises: 0
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    Proposition 5 shows that, as the capital share in the production function increases, the 
cost of government ownership or political intervention in the form of capital subsidy grows 
                                                        
26 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). 
27 They use ROS (return on sales), ROA (return on assets) and ROE (return on equity) as 
performance measures. 
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greater than its benefit (profit extraction), so the government decides to reduce its ownership in 
SOEs. From 1994 to 2003, in China’s GDP, the proportion of industry increased from 47% to 
52% while the proportion of agriculture decreased from 20% to 14%. This structural change 
led to the rise of capital share because industry is much more capital-intensive than agriculture, 
especially for China. Therefore, Proposition 5 shows that it should be the optimal strategy for 
the Chinese government to reduce its ownership in SOEs and accelerate privatization during 
this period. Indeed, Figure 3-1 shows that privatization did accelerate during this period. A 
policy implication of proposition 5 is: for capital-intensive firms, it may be the optimal 
strategy for the government to reduce its ownership in them. It seems that the Chinese 
government has followed such an optimal strategy. For example, figure 3-2 shows that, most 
of the firms that have been privatized by the end of 2002 are in the more capital-intensive 
manufacturing industry.  
Number of Privatized Firms
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  Note: By the end of 2002, 116 state-owned enterprises had been privatized. By the end of 
2003, 178 state-owned enterprises had been privatized. 
  Figure 3-1: The Number of Firms with Change-of-Control Within Each Year (Not 
cumulative) 
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Industrial Distribution of Privatized Listed Firms
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Note: Among the 116 firms that had been privatized by the end of 2002, most firms (48%) are 
in the manufacturing industry. 
 
Figure 3-2: The Industrial Distribution of Privatized Listed Firms 
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The advantages of the above model over previous treatments in this literature are: 
(1) In a single analytical framework capturing the main features of the Chinese economy, 
both the causes (Propositions 4 and 5) and the effects (Propositions 1, 2, 3 and Lemma 1) of 
privatization are unambiguously explained; 
(2) The results are robust for different parameter values of A, n, c, α  and β , which 
means they hold for heterogeneous industries or firms; 
  (3) The model does not assume incomplete contracts between the government and the firm 
manager, as Grossman and Hart (1986) do. It does not allow the existence of bribes from firm 
managers to politicians, as Shleifer and Vishny (1994) do. In other words, even without 
resorting to incomplete contracts or the possibility of bribes, this model still shows that (a) the 
reduction in government ownership or political intervention unambiguously increases firm 
productivity and profitability and reduces redundant employment; (b) the government 
optimally reduces its ownership or political intervention in response to a growing share of 
capital (or capital-intensive industries) in GDP.  Both results are well supported by empirical 
evidence. The model also has an important policy implication that it is more beneficial for the 
government to reduce its ownership or political intervention in capital-intensive firms such as 
the emerging high-tech firms. 
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4. Summary of Chapter 
     The privatization wave has swept the whole world since 1979. This represents one of the 
most important institutional changes in our era. Despite extensive empirical evidence on the 
positive effects of privatization on firm performance (measured by profitability and 
productivity), formal theoretical models are surprisingly lacking. Existing models impose 
strong assumptions and generate results that are sensitive to parameter values (e.g., the 
assumption of the existence of bribes between firm managers and politicians in Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994)). This chapter offers one of the first formal theoretical models of share issue 
privatization. This model with a realistic setup and weak assumptions generates strong results 
that are insensitive to parameter values. This analytical framework will hopefully open a new 
avenue for theoretical research in the privatization field.  
     An important future research direction is to incorporate firm competition into the theory. 
The intuition is: as the government reduces its political intervention, more firms become 
profitable and so more firms will be attracted into the industry. Meanwhile, the transition 
economies such as China usually liberalize their markets along with their privatization 
programs. This should result in more fierce firm competition and drive down profitability. 
With both the positive effect of changes of control and the negative effect of increased 
competition, the net effect on profitability will then depend on which effect dominates. 
Change-of-control matters because it represents a dramatic fall in the degree of government 
ownership and political intervention, the positive impact of which is great enough to offset the 
negative impact of increased competition on profitability. So the model should generate a 
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“threshold” that can only be passed by a dramatic decrease in government ownership or 
political intervention. For example, in the N-Firm Cournot model with a constant marginal cost 
c and a linear demand funtion: P=A-B(Q-i+qi), where Q-i is the total product of firms other 
than the ith firm, the textbook example (Pepall, Richards and Norman, 1999, p. 353) shows 
that the equilibrium profit for each firm equal to: 
            2
2
)1(
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=
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iπ   
This simple result analytically tracks the decline of profitability due to intensified competition 
(as N increases, iπ  decreases). It can be expected that once this result is incorporated into the 
model in this chapter, the share issue privatization model with a competition element would 
generate an ownership “threshold” for privatization to “work”, and this “threshold” can be 
interpreted as the ownership level that marks a “change-of-control.”  
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APPENDIX: PROOFS  
 
The proofs are organized in the order of a backward induction. 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: The second-period firm manager’s maximization problem: 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
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PROOF OF PART OF PROPOSITION 4: 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
 
(7) Profitability=ROS (Return on Sales) 
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PROOF OF PART OF PROPOSITION 4: 
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PROOF OF PART OF PROPOSTION 4: 
 
Plug (3) into (2): 
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By (5), 1-a-an>0;By assumption, 01 >−− βα and 1-α >0, 1>a>0. Therefore, 0
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When n=0, we can get the benchmark optimal employment for profit maximization. As n 
increases, employment deviates from that benchmark level, and more redundant workers are 
employed. 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: 
 
The first-period government’s maximization problem (endogenizing a) 
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Q.E.D. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
SHARE ISSUE PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA: EVIDENCE 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Although the model in chapter III unambiguously predicts that privatization should 
improve the profitability and productivity of SOEs as redundant workers get laid off, has 
China’s share issue privatization really worked? It seems so at the aggregate level. As Holz 
(2003) indicates, “by 2001, the number of industrial sectors in which SOEs were running 
aggregate losses was down to four (from twenty-five).”(p. vii) However, at the firm level, the 
results are mixed. Although Wei et al. (2003), Sun and Tong (2003) and Wang, Xu and Zhu 
(2004) find some evidence of productivity enhancement, they do not find significant changes 
in profitability after IPOs, and in many cases, they even find significant decreases in 
profitability. This decrease in profitability is puzzling given the robust evidence of significant 
and positive effects of privatization on profitability in other countries. 28 
     How can one explain this “profitability puzzle”? I argue that for China, the key “regime 
change” may not occur at the IPO of an SOE, but at the change of control from the State to 
private owners. As a result, if a researcher just compares the profitability of an SOE before and 
after the IPO, the researcher may not detect any profitability improvement. This is because as 
shown in Chapter III, though the positive “convergence-of-interests effect” has greatly reduced 
the sources of inefficiencies of SOEs according to the “managerial view”, without a shift of 
control rights from the State to private entities, the negative “political-intervention effect” still 
                                                        
28 See, for example, Megginson et al. (1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998) and D’Souza and 
Megginson (1999). 
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hurts SOEs’ performance. Therefore, an IPO without a change-of-control will not reduce the 
negative “political-intervention effect” on firm profitability. For example, if after an IPO, an 
SOE reduces its proportion of State shares in total shares from 70% to 60%, then as the largest 
shareholder, the State still maintains effective control of the firm, and the negative 
“political-intervention effect” has not been mitigated. With the government still keeping 
control rights, the decision-making process and the objective function of the firm manager will 
not change. The stock market investors may play a monitoring role to some degree, but there 
will probably not be a “regime change” without a change of control. Therefore, unsurprisingly, 
no significant profitability improvement has been detected after the IPOs. 
      Formally, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) study a Nash-bargaining model between 
politicians and firm managers, and show that (1) “as long as politicians maintain control over 
firms through direct public control or regulation, privatizing cash flows reduces efficiency and 
increases corruption,” and (2) “managerial control leads to more efficient resource allocation 
than politician control.”(p. 998) Barberis et al.’s (1996) study of 452 privatized Russian shops 
shows that “the presence of new owners and new managers raises the likelihood of 
restructuring…the evidence points to the critical role new human capital plays in economic 
transformation.”(p. 764) This intuition is confirmed by Frydman et al.’s (1999) study of 
Central European transition economies too. In the context of China, Sun and Tong (2003) 
admit that, “there is not much change in corporate governance in China because the 
government is still the largest shareholder and effective control of the privatized firms.”(p. 
210) The reason that Sun and Tong (2003) fail to detect any change-of-control is that they 
focus on the data between 1994 and 1998, while most changes-of-control occurred after 1998, 
as Figure 4-1 illustrates.            
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      Based on the above reasoning, I define a change-of-control as the change of the largest 
shareholder from the State to a private owner. Based on the theoretical results of chapter III, I 
argue that profitability improvements should occur for those firms that have actually 
experienced transfer of control. Among all listed firms from 1994 to 2003, 178 SOEs have 
shifted control from the State to non-state legal entities or individuals.29   
      Part 2 of this Chapter discusses data, methodology and results, part 3 discusses related 
literature, and part 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data, Methodology and Results 
      (A) Data 
      To test the hypothesis that “change-of-control matters”, I analyze the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) Database developed by Shenzhen GTA 
Information Technology Co. Ltd. This database covers (1) all financial statements and 
ownership structures of all listed companies in China from 1992 to 2003; (2) all stock market 
trading data; (3) some corporate governance measures. For the change-of-control data, I use 
the “Private Listed Companies Database” developed by the SinoFin Information Services of 
China Center for Economic Research (CCER) at Peking University.30 
      (B) Methodology 
      Following the major empirical approaches in the privatization literature, I will first 
conduct a cross-sectional comparison between the privatized firms and SOEs, and then I will 
                                                        
29 There are four major types of shares in China’s SOEs: state shares, state legal entity shares, 
non-state legal entity shares and private individual shares. There are no preferred stocks; so all 
shares are common stocks with the same control rights and cash flow rights. 
30  I also double-checked these data with a leading Chinese financial website: 
http://finance.sina.com.cn.  
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use a univariate event study approach to examine the changes in profitability, productivity, 
employment and leverage before and after the change-of-control. After that, I will take into 
consideration other factors affecting firm performance and study the effects of privatization in 
a multivariate framework. To fix the endogeneity problem in the privatization-performance 
relationship, I will estimate two-stage-least-squares models. Lastly, I will examine the sources 
of improvements in profitability and productivity due to change-of-control. Specifically, I will 
examine if the improvements in corporate governance, especially the management turnovers at 
the changes-of-control, can account for the improvements in firm performance. 
     (C) Results 
     Figure 4-1 shows that, 178 SOEs have been privatized by the end of 2003, and 116 firms 
have been privatized by the end of 2002. Figure 4-2 shows that, in the majority of cases, the 
private owner controls about 30% of total shares when it gains control. 
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By the end of 2002, 116 state-owned enterprises had been privatized. By the end of 
2003, 178 state-owned enterprises had been privatized. 
Figure 4-1: The Number of Firms with Change-of-Control Within Each Year (Not 
cumulative) 
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Note: Most private shareholders control about 30% of the total shares of a firm when 
they gain control of the firm. 
Figure 4-2: The Share of the Controlling Private Shareholder when the Private 
Owner Gained Control (1994-2003) 
 
 
a) Cross-sectional Study Results 
     Figures 4-3, 4-4 and 4-5 show that, in at least 7 years out of the 10 years from 1994 to 
2003, the privatized firms enjoy higher profitability than SOEs. Also notable is that the 
profitability of both privatized firms and SOEs trend downward. This is due to increased 
competition during this period, especially the competition caused by the entry of firms from 
the private sector. For example, International Finance Corporation (2000) shows that, during 
1991—1997, the output of domestic private firms in China grew on average at an amazing rate 
of 71% per year (p.1). Between 1985 and 1997, the share of private sector in China’s national 
industrial output rose from 2% to more than 34% (p.16). 
 
 
 58 
Mean Return on Assets
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Ye
ar State ROA
Private ROA
 
 
 
(a) Mean Return on Assets of Privatized Firms versus SOEs 
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(b) Median Return on Assets of Privatized Firms versus SOEs 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Return on Assets of Privatized Firms versus SOEs 
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(a) Mean Return on Equity of Privatized Firms versus SOEs 
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(b) Median Return on Equity of Privatized Firms versus SOEs 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Return on Equity of Privatized Firms versus SOEs 
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(a) Mean Return on Sales of Privatized Firms versus SOEs 
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(b) Median Return on Sales of Privatized Firms versus SOEs 
 
 
 
Figure 4-5: Return on Sales of Privatized Firms versus SOEs 
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   b) Univariate Event Study Results         
    For those 116 SOEs that transferred control, following the routine in the literature, I use a 
three-year window around the change-of-control year (three years before and three years after 
the change-of-control, and the change-of-control year is not counted in either the 
post-privatization period or the pre-privatization period because the change-of-control year 
involves both periods). For some firms that have fewer than 3 years before or after the 
change-of-control, I average over the actual number of years. 31  The sample size is 
considerably larger than the samples in three major published papers in this field. 32 I 
benchmark the mean (median) profitability and productivity against the mean (median) 
profitability and productivity of all listed firms in China. Then I conduct t-tests and Wilcoxon 
tests to examine whether the mean and median profitability (ROA, ROE or ROS) is increased 
and the mean and median leverage is reduced after the change of control. The results in Panel 
A of Table 4-1 show that mean ROA and ROS both increase significantly (at 1% level) after 
the change-of-control. Surprisingly, mean leverage (i.e., “debt/assets”) also increases 
significantly after the change-of-control. Panel B of Table 4-1 shows that median ROE and 
ROS both increase significantly (at 1% level) after the change-of-control, while median 
leverage also increases significantly after the change-of-control.                 
    Next, I calculate the annual average profitability and leverage around the 
change-of-control year. The results are reported in Figure 4-6. These figure shows that the 
change-of-control is indeed a pivotal event. Before the change-of-control, ROA (benchmarked 
                                                        
31 This kind of “unbalanced window” is also a feature of other studies in this field, e.g., 
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) and Gupta (2005). 
32 These three papers are: Megginson et al. (1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), D’Souza and 
Megginson (1999), all in the Journal of Finance. My sample of 116 firms is 30% larger than 
the largest sample in those three papers—85 firms in D’Souza and Megginson (1999). 
 62 
against the the mean and median performance of all listed firms) declines sharply, and around 
the change-of-control, it starts improving, and it steadily keeps improving after the 
change-of-control. It seems that leverage increases steadily, which is consistent with results of 
Huang and Song (2006), who show that the average leverage of all Chinese listed firms seem 
to increase from year to year . 
      In order to compare the productivity and employment before and after the change of 
control, I have collected employment data from 1999 to 2003 for 102 firms from the CSMAR 
database (the sample period is shorter and the sample size is smaller than in the study of 
profitability due to data availability). The t-test results for mean productivity and employment 
are presented in Panel C of Table 4-1. The increase in labor productivity is impressive. Mean 
profit per employee (benchmarked against all listed firms) turns from a negative number to a 
positive number—the change-of-control is indeed a turning point. These results are consistent 
with theoretical predictions in chapter III that labor productivity rises while employment 
decreases after privatization. The Wilcoxon test results for median productivity and 
employment in Panel D of Table 4-1 lend further support to the conclusion that 
change-of-control matters: the change-of-control significantly improves labor productivity and 
reduces excess employment, thus increasing the efficiency of those firms.   
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Table 4-1: Comparing Performance, Leverage and Employment before and after 
Change-of-control 
 
 
 
Panel A. Mean profitability and leverage changes (benchmarked against mean profitability 
and leverage of all listed firms) 
 
Variable Number of Firms Mean Before Mean After Difference 
ROA 116 -0.012 0.022 0.034*** 
ROE 116 0.067 0.084 0.017 
ROS 116 0.178 0.434 0.256*** 
Leverage 116 0.032 0.077 0.045*** 
 
 
 
Panel B. Median profitability and leverage changes (benchmarked against median profitability 
and leverage of all listed firms) 
 
Variables Number of Firms Median Before Median After Difference 
ROA 116 -0.010 -0.006 0.004 
ROE 116 -0.060 -0.047 0.013*** 
ROS 116 -0.019 0.014 0.033*** 
Leverage 116 0.032 0.096 0.034*** 
 
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
 
 
Note: This table reports the significant changes in profitability and leverage of China’s listed 
firms after their control rights shift from the State to private owners. The windows used for 
comparison are three years before and three years after the change-of-control year. If there are 
fewer years before or after the change-of-control year, then the actual number of years is used. 
Panel A and B report the significant improvements in profitability, benchmarked against mean 
or median profitability of all listed firms. 
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Table 4-1: Comparing Performance, Leverage and Employment before and after 
Change-of-control 
 
 
Panel C. Mean productivity (in million RMB) and employment changes (benchmarked against 
mean productivity of all listed firms) 
          
Variable Number of Firms Mean Before Mean After Difference
Sales/Employee 102 0.488 1.246 0.758***
Profit/Employee 102 -0.111 0.065 0.177** 
Employment 102 1730 1627 -103 
 
 
 
Panel D. Median productivity (in million RMB) and employment changes (benchmarked 
against median productivity of all listed firms) 
 
         
Variables Number of Firms Median Before Median After Difference 
Sales/Employee 102 -0.131 0.137 0.268 
Profit/Employee 102 -0.007 -0.001 0.006** 
Employment 102 634 1208 -574*** 
 
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
 
 
Note: This table reports the significant changes in profitability, productivity, leverage and 
employment of China’s listed firms after their control rights shift from the State to private 
owners. The windows used for comparison are three years before and three years after the 
change-of-control year. If there are fewer years before or after the change-of-control year, then 
the actual number of years is used. Panel C and Panel D report significant improvements in 
labor productivity and reductions in employment benchmarked against mean or median labor 
productivity of all listed firms. The number of employees is not benchmarked against mean or 
median employment of all listed firms. 
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Panel A. Mean ROA and Median ROA (return on assets) 
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Panel B. Mean Leverage and Median Leverage  
 
Notes: 1) Year 0: Change-of-control Year (Year 0 is not illustrated here because it involves 
both pre-privatization and post-privatization periods) 
2) Both mean (median) ROA and mean (median) leverage have been benchmarked  
against the mean (median) ROA and mean(median) leverage of all listed firms. 
 
 
Figure 4-6. Profitability and leverage changes before and after the change-of-control 
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c) Multivariate Analysis Results 
     The univariate analysis has not taken into consideration other factors affecting 
profitability, notably firm size, leverage and business cycle. To overcome this problem, I 
estimate the following multivariate regression in panel A of Table 4-2: 
     tititititiiti sizeleverageGDPPOSTROA ,,41,3,2,1, εααααα +++++= −  
     In the above regression, POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the SOE has been 
privatized (expected sign: +), GDP is the per capita GDP measured at purchasing power 
parity33 (used to capture the business cycle effects, expected sign: +), size is measured by 
log(assets) or log(sales)34 (expected sign:+), leverage is calculated as debt/assets (a measure 
of risk, expected sign: +). Leverage is lagged one period in order to avoid the endogeneity 
problem.35 The results are presented in Table 4-2, which shows that the post-privatization 
dummy, POST, significantly and positively affects firm profitability in both fixed effects 
models and random effects models. As Sun and Tong (2003) point out, “once individual (or 
firm-specific) time-invariant variables are controlled, the possible effects of industry are also 
controlled and so the industry dummy is not necessary under such formulation.”(p. 211) For 
the same reason, I have not included the industry dummy in my specifications. This evidence 
lends further support to the argument that “change-of-control matters”, even after conditioning 
on other factors.36 Panel B of Table 4-2 reports results for the following regression: 
                                                        
33 Data source: the World Development Indicators (2004) of the World Bank. 
34  Fama-French (1995) three-factor CAPM model shows that firm size affects firm 
performance due to the economy of scale. 
35 It is well known that profitability is a significant determinant of firm leverage.  
36 GDP is significantly and negatively correlated with ROA. This reflects the opposite 
directions of movements of the two variables: the upward trend of GDP (rapid economic 
growth) and the downward trend of ROA (due to increased market competition). Leverage is 
significantly and negatively correlated with ROA. This may be due to the fact that leverage is 
not a good measure of risks for SOEs in China due to the “soft-budget constraints.” 
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tititititiiti sizeleverageGDPPOSTROS ,,41,3,2,1, εααααα +++++= −  
The evidence in panel A and panel B of Table 4-2 shows that, even after controlling for 
other factors that may affect the profitability of firms, privatized firms still enjoy significantly 
higher ROA and ROS. For example, their ROA is about 2-3 percentage points higher than 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and their ROS is about 7-8 percentage points higher than the 
SOEs.  
    Panel C of Table 4-2 reports regression results for the following regression: 
    tititititiiti sizeleverageGDPPOSTPPE ,,41,3,2,1, εααααα +++++= −  
where “PPE” refers to “Profits Per Employee”. The results in Panel C of Table 4-2 show that 
the labor productivity is significantly higher for privatized firms than the SOEs—the 
privatized firms enjoy 0.4-0.6 million RMB higher profits per employee. 
In order to fix the endogeneity problem associated with the post-privatization dummy, 
“POST” and firm performance measures in the above multivariate regressions, I then estimate 
two-stage-least-squares models. In the first stage, I use a Logit or Probit model in order to get 
fitted value of the probability of being privatized. In this stage, I regress the dummy variable 
“POST” on lagged profitability variables (ROA or ROS), lagged size variables (log(assets) or 
log(sales)), and lagged leverage and get fitted values of “POST”, which are then used in the 
second stage regression as an independent variable. Specifically, the two-stage-least-squares 
regressions are as follows: 
    The first-stage: 
    titititiiti leveragesizePPOST ,1,31,21,1, εαααα +++++= −−−  
where “P” is a profitability measure (ROA or ROS). 
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Table 4-2: The impact of change-of-control on firm performance (panel regression 
results) 
 
Panel A: The impact of change-of-control on profitability (ROA--return on assets) 
 
            
Dependent variable: ROA (return on assets)       
  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
POST 0.026 0.027  0.021 0.021 
 (0.009)*** (0.009)***  (0.013)* (0.013)* 
log(assets) 0.010  0.006  
 (0.005)*   (0.011)  
log(sales)  0.007   0.013 
  (0.003)**   (0.007)* 
GDP -0.024 -0.023  -0.024 -0.026 
 (0.007)*** (0.007)***  (0.010)** (0.010)* 
leverage -0.098 -0.098  -0.047 -0.044 
 (0.025)*** (0.025)***  (0.035) (0.035) 
R2 0.058 0.058  0.049 0.041 
No. of firms 116 116  116 116 
No. of observations 606 606  606 606 
  
 
***，**， and * denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Note: This table reports results of the panel regressions: 
     tititititiiti sizeleverageGDPPOSTROA ,,41,3,2,1, εααααα +++++= −  
The dependent variable is ROA (Return on Assets). The independent variables are: POST (a 
dummy variable which equals one if the firm has changed control from the State to a private 
owner), GDP (per capita real GDP measured at purchasing power parity, divided by 1000 for 
normalization purposes), leverage (debt/assets), and log(Assets) or log(Sales). White-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4-2: The impact of change-of-control on firm performance (panel regression 
results) 
 
Panel B: The impact of change-of-control on Profitability (ROS--return on sales) 
 
            
Dependent variable: ROS (return on sales)       
        Random Effects        Fixed Effects 
POST 0.077 0.079  0.069 0.074 
 (0.029)*** (0.029)***  (0.039)* (0.039)* 
log(assets) 0.021   0.032  
 (0.017)   (0.032)  
log(sales)  -0.019   -0.022 
  (0.012)*   (0.022) 
GDP -0.065 -0.052  -0.075 -0.059 
 (0.022)***   (0.022)**  (0.032)** (0.030)** 
leverage -0.152 -0.158  -0.120 -0.129 
 (0.081)* (0.081)**  (0.107) (0.107) 
R2 0.026 0.032  0.023 0.030 
No. of firms 116 116  116 116 
No. of observations 606 606  606 606 
  
 
***，**， and * denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Note: This table reports results of the panel regressions: 
     tititititiiti sizeleverageGDPPOSTROS ,,41,3,2,1, εααααα +++++= −  
The dependent variable is ROS (Return on Sales). The independent variables are: POST (a 
dummy variable which equals one if the firm has changed control from the State to private 
owners), GDP (per capita real GDP measured at purchasing power parity, divided by 1000 for 
normalization purposes), leverage (debt/assets), and log(Assets) or log(Sales). White-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4-2: The impact of change-of-control on firm performance (panel regression 
results) 
 
Panel C: The impact of change-of-control on Productivity (Profit per Employee)  
 
            
Dependent variable: PPE (Profit Per Employee)       
        Random Effects          Fixed Effects 
POST 0.433 0.459  0.525 0.556 
 (0.152)*** (0.147)***    (0.177)*** (0.177)*** 
log(assets) 0.425   0.459  
 (0.088)***     (0.164)***  
log(sales)  0.350   0.250 
  (0.050)***   (0.105)** 
GDP -0.346 -0.337  -0.408 -0.359 
   (0.140)***  (0.140)***      (0.156)** 
leverage 0.340 0.236  0.434 0.228 
 (0.241) (0.227)  (0.291) (0.270) 
R2 0.083 0.157  0.082 0.145 
No. of firms 102 102  102 102 
No. of observations 391 391  391 391 
  
 
***，**， and * denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Note: This table reports results of the panel regressions: 
     tititititiiti sizeleverageGDPPOSTPPE ,,41,3,2,1, εααααα +++++= −  
The dependent variable is PPE (Profit Per Employee, unit: million RMB). The independent 
variables are: POST (a dummy variable which equals one if the firm has changed control from 
the State to private owners), GDP (per capita real GDP measured at purchasing power parity), 
leverage (debt/assets), and log(Assets) or log(Sales). All coefficients are measured in millions 
except the coefficient of GDP, which is measured in thousands. White-robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
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      The second-stage: 
      tititititiiti sizeleverageGDPPOSTROA ,,41,3,2,1, εααααα +++++= −  
      where “POST” is the fitted value from the first-stage regression. 
Table 4-3 reports the results from the full sample (1146 listed firms with 6481 
observations)37. Panel A shows that there may not be serious endogeneity problems between 
ROA and “POST”, but there seems to be serious endogeneity problem between ROS and 
“POST”. Therefore, I focus on the regression in the last column in Panel A, and get fitted 
values of “POST” from that regression. Then I use these fitted values as an independent 
variable “POST” in the second-stage regression and get Panel B. The results in Panel B show 
that privatized firms do enjoy significantly higher profitability, even after controlling for other 
affecting factors and the endogeneity problem. Panel C and Panel D reports results from a 
two-stage-least-squares regression using the Probit model in the first stage. The results are 
qualitatively similar. Panel B of Table 4-3 confirms the results from Panel A of Table 4-2: 
privatized firms enjoy about 2-3 percentage higher ROA than SOEs. The results in Panel C of 
Table 4-3 are qualitatively similar to those in Panel B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
37 I have deleted 54 private firms that have directly “gone public” by IPOs from the original 
full sample of 1200 firms. Thus, the full sample here does not include those private firms that 
have never been owned by the State. 
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Table 4- 3: Two-Stage-Least-Squares Regression Results (Full sample)  
 
Panel A: The First Stage Regression: The impact of lagged profitability on privatization (Logit 
regression) 
 
        
Dependent variable: Privatization dummy     
     
ROA 0.815 1.434   
 (0.931) (0.945)   
ROS   1.199 0.837 
   (0.322)*** (0.294)*** 
log(assets) -0.323  -0.342  
 (0.079)***  (0.079)***  
log(sales)  -0.475  -0.457 
  (0.060)***  (0.060)*** 
leverage 3.588 3.791 3.967 3.856 
 (0.470)*** (0.472)*** (0.432)*** (0.429)*** 
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.070 0.055 0.073 
No. of firms 1146 1146 1146 1146 
No. of observations 6481 6481 6481 6481 
  
***，**， and * denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Note: This table reports results of the panel regressions: 
     titititiiti leveragesizePPOST ,1,31,21,1, εαααα +++++= −−−  
The dependent variable is POST (post-privatization dummy). The independent variables are: 
lagged “P”, i.e., profitability (ROA or ROS), lagged size (log(Assets) or log(Sales)) and lagged 
leverage (debt/assets). White-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4- 3: Two-Stage-Least-Squares Regression Results (Full sample)  
 
Panel B: The Second-stage Regression: Effects of Privatization on ROA (Return on Assets) 
 
            
Dependent variable: ROA (return on assets)       
         Random Effects           Fixed Effects 
POST 0.017 0.020  0.025 0.024 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)***  (0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
log(assets) 0.007   0.001  
 (0.001)***   (0.002)  
log(sales)  0.010   0.014 
  (0.001)***   (0.002)*** 
GDP -0.019 -0.019  -0.022 -0.026 
 (0.001)***   (0.001)***  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
leverage -0.160 -0.160  -0.101 -0.101 
 (0.010)*** (0.007)***  (0.010)*** (0.010)*** 
R2 0.143 0.154  0.110 0.125 
No. of firms 1146 1146  1146 1146 
No. of observations 6481 6481  6481 6481 
  
 
***，**， and * denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Note: This table reports results of the panel regressions: 
     tititititiiti sizeleverageGDPPOSTROA ,,41,3,2,1, εααααα +++++= −  
The dependent variable is ROA (Return on Assets). The independent variables are: POST (the 
fitted value of POST from the first-stage regression), GDP (per capita real GDP measured at 
purchasing power parity, divided by 1000 for normalization purposes), leverage (debt/assets), 
and log(Assets) or log(Sales). White-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4- 3: Two-Stage-Least-Squares Regression Results (Full sample)  
 
Panel C: The First Stage Regression: The impact of lagged profitability on privatization 
(Probit regression) 
 
        
Dependent variable: Privatization dummy     
     
ROA 0.135 0.418   
 (0.423) (0.434)   
ROS   0.463 0.327 
   (0.141)*** (0.134)** 
log(assets) -0.148  -0.156  
 (0.036)***  (0.036)***  
log(sales)  -0.211  -0.204 
  (0.028)***  (0.028)*** 
leverage 1.775 1.856 1.941 1.911 
 (0.206)*** (0.208)*** (0.192)*** (0.194)*** 
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.074 0.058 0.076 
No. of firms 1146 1146 1146 1146 
No. of observations 6481 6481 6481 6481 
  
 
***，**， and * denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Note: This table reports results of the panel regressions: 
     titititiiti leveragesizePPOST ,1,31,21,1, εαααα +++++= −−−  
The dependent variable is POST (post-privatization dummy). The independent variables are: 
lagged “P”, i.e., profitability (ROA or ROS), lagged size (log(Assets) or log(Sales)) and lagged 
leverage (debt/assets). White-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4- 3: Two-Stage-Least-Squares Regression Results (Full sample)  
 
Panel D: The Second-stage Regression: Effects of Privatization on ROA (Return on Assets) 
 
            
Dependent variable: ROA (return on assets)       
         Random Effects           Fixed Effects 
POST 0.105 0.352  0.029 0.282 
 (0.038)*** (0.042)***  (0.048) (0.053)***
log(assets) -0.008   0.002  
 (0.001)***   (0.003)  
log(sales)  0.015   0.020 
  (0.001)***   (0.002)***
GDP -0.018 -0.018  -0.022 -0.024 
   (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** (0.001)***
leverage -0.180 -0.231  -0.106 -0.170 
  (0.011)*** (0.011)***  (0.016)*** (0.017)***
R2 0.143 0.162  0.115 0.136 
No. of firms 1146 1146  1146 1146 
No. of observations 6481 6481  6481 6481 
  
 
***，**， and * denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Note: This table reports results of the panel regressions: 
     tititititiiti sizeleverageGDPPOSTROA ,,41,3,2,1, εααααα +++++= −  
The dependent variable is ROA (Return on Assets). The independent variables are: POST (the 
fitted value of POST from the first-stage regression), GDP (per capita real GDP measured at 
purchasing power parity, divided by 1000 for normalization purposes), leverage (debt/assets), 
and log(Assets) or log(Sales). White-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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For robustness check, Table 4-4 reports two-stage-least-squares regression results from a 
small sample—those firms that have been privatized between 1994 and 2002. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those in Table 4-3.  
                
Table 4-4: Two-Stage-Least-Squares Regression Results (Small sample)  
 
Panel A: The First Stage Regression: The impact of lagged profitability on privatization (Logit 
regression) 
 
        
Dependent variable: Privatization dummy     
     
ROA 0.515 0.971   
 (1.15) (1.135)   
ROS   0.658 0.831 
   (0.359)* (0.358)** 
log(assets) 0.587  0.579  
 (0.116)***  (0.115)***  
log(sales)  0.146  0.168 
  (0.079)*  (0.079)** 
leverage 3.257 3.589 3.422 3.698 
 (0.707)*** (0.706)*** (0.677)*** (0.677)*** 
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.043 0.076 0.049 
No. of firms 116 116 116 116 
No. of observations 606 606 606 606 
  
 
***，**， and * denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Note: This table reports results of the panel regressions: 
    titititiiti leveragesizePPOST ,1,31,21,1, εαααα +++++= −−−  
The dependent variable is POST (post-privatization dummy). The independent variables are: 
lagged “P”, i.e., profitability (ROA or ROS), lagged size (log(Assets) or log(Sales)) and lagged 
leverage (debt/assets). White-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4-4: Two-Stage-Least-Squares Regression Results (Small sample)  
 
Panel B: The Second-stage Regression: Effects of Privatization on ROA (Return on Assets) 
 
            
Dependent variable: ROA (return on assets)       
          Random Effects           Fixed Effects 
POST 0.396 0.442  0.214 0.194 
    (0.066)*** (0.068)***  (0.076)*** (0.084)** 
log(assets) -0.010   -0.003  
   (0.006)*   (0.011)  
log(sales)  -0.010   0.002 
  (0.004)***   (0.008) 
GDP -0.009 -0.011  -0.011 -0.013 
  (0.005)* (0.005)**  (0.007) (0.007)** 
leverage -0.380 -0.420  -0.190 -0.176 
   (0.053)*** (0.055)***    (0.061)*** (0.066)*** 
R2 0.101 0.106  0.093 0.081 
No. of firms 116 116  116 116 
No. of observations 606 606  606 606 
  
 
***，**， and * denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Note: This table reports results of the panel regressions: 
     tititititiiti sizeleverageGDPPOSTROA ,,41,3,2,1, εααααα +++++= −  
The dependent variable is ROA (Return on Assets). The independent variables are: POST (the 
fitted value of POST from the first-stage regression), GDP (per capita real GDP measured at 
purchasing power parity, divided by 1000 for normalization purposes), leverage (debt/assets), 
and log(Assets) or log(Sales). White-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4-4: Two-Stage-Least-Squares Regression Results (Small sample)  
 
Panel C: The First Stage Regression: The impact of lagged profitability on privatization 
(Probit regression) 
 
        
Dependent variable: Privatization dummy    
     
ROA 0.247 0.605   
 (0.658) (0.649)   
ROS   0.356 0.480 
   (0.211)* (0.210)** 
log(assets) 0.355  0.348  
 (0.069)***  (0.069)***  
Log(sales)  0.089  0.101 
    (0.048)**  (0.048)** 
leverage 1.931 2.185 2.002 2.211 
 (0.415)***   (0.422)*** (0.390)***  (0.395)*** 
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.042 0.074 0.048 
No. of firms 116 116 116 116 
No. of observations 606 606 606 606 
  
 
***，**， and * denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Note: This table reports results of the panel regressions: 
     titititiiti leveragesizePPOST ,1,31,21,1, εαααα +++++= −−−  
The dependent variable is POST (post-privatization dummy). The independent variables are: 
lagged “P”, i.e., profitability (ROA or ROS), lagged size (log(Assets) or log(Sales)) and lagged 
leverage (debt/assets). White-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4-4: Two-Stage-Least-Squares Regression Results (Small sample)  
 
Panel D: The Second-stage Regression: Effects of Privatization on ROA (Return on Assets) 
 
            
Dependent variable: ROA (return on assets)       
        Random Effects           Fixed Effects 
POST 0.418 0.476  0.230 0.210 
 (0.069)*** (0.072)***  (0.080)*** (0.089)** 
log(assets) -0.011   -0.004  
 (0.006)*   (0.011)  
log(sales)  -0.011   0.002 
  (0.004)***   (0.009) 
GDP -0.009 -0.010  -0.011 -0.013 
  (0.005)* (0.005)**  (0.007) (0.006)** 
leverage -0.389 -0.437  -0.198 -0.185 
  (0.054)*** (0.056)***  (0.063)*** (0.069)***
R2 0.102 0.108  0.094 0.081 
No. of firms 116 116  116 116 
No. of observations 606 606  606 606 
  
 
***，**， and * denote significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Note: This table reports results of the panel regressions: 
     tititititiiti sizeleverageGDPPOSTROA ,,41,3,2,1, εααααα +++++= −  
The dependent variable is ROA (Return on Assets). The independent variables are: POST (the 
fitted value of POST from the first-stage regression), GDP (per capita real GDP measured at 
purchasing power parity, divided by 1000 for normalization purposes), leverage (debt/assets), 
and log(Assets) or log(Sales). White-robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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For robustness check, in Table 4-5, I use a stronger definition of “change-of-control”, 
i.e., the private owner has gained majority shares in the firm. Table 4-5 shows that, mean and 
median profitability increases after privatization for those firms too. Though the small sample 
size seriously limits the power of statistical tests (t-tests and Wilcoxon tests), the results 
regarding profitability are consistent with the results of more powerful tests in a larger sample 
as reported in Table 4-1.  
 
Table 4-5: Comparing Performance, Leverage and Employment before and after 
Change-of-control for Firms that a Private Owner Has Gained Majority Shares 
 
Panel A. Mean profitability and leverage changes (benchmarked against mean profitability 
and leverage of all listed firms) 
 
     
Variable Number of Firms Mean Before Mean After Difference
     ROA 7 -0.056 0.014 0.069 
     ROS 7 0.131 0.361 0.230 
   Leverage 7 0.080 0.141 -0.061 
 
 
Panel B. Median profitability and leverage changes (benchmarked against median profitability 
and leverage of all listed firms) 
 
Variable Number of Firms Median Before Median After Difference
ROA 7 -0.033 -0.007 0.026 
ROS 7 0.000 0.006 0.006 
Leverage 7 0.140 0.093 -0.047 
 
 
Note: This table reports the changes in profitability and leverage of China’s listed firms after 
their control rights shift from the State to private owners for those firms that the private owners 
have gained a majority of shares . The windows used for comparison are three years before 
and three years after the change-of-control year. If there are fewer years before or after the 
change-of-control year, then the actual number of years is used. Panel A and B report the 
improvements in profitability, benchmarked against mean or median profitability of all listed 
firms. Due to very small sample size, the changes are not statistically significant. However, 
their signs are generally consistent with theoretical predictions. 
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For robustness check, Table 4-6 reconstructs the “profitability puzzle”—profitability 
falls after IPOs for China’s listed firms. Table 4-6 shows that profitability did indeed 
significantly decrease after IPOs for the sample of 116 firms that have changed control from 
the State to private owners between 1994 and 2002, confirming the results of Sun and Tong 
(2003), etc.  
 
Table 4-6: Comparing Profitability before and after the IPO (“Profitability Puzzle” 
Reconstructed) 
 
Panel A. Mean profitability changes (not benchmarked against mean profitability of all listed 
firms) 
 
Variable Number of Firms Mean Before Mean After Difference 
ROA 116 0.110 0.047 -0.063*** 
ROE 116 0.254 0.051 -0.203*** 
ROS 116 0.210 -0.108 -0.317* 
 
 
Panel B. Mean profitability changes (benchmarked against mean profitability of all listed 
firms) 
 
Variable Number of Firms Mean Before Mean After Difference 
ROA 116 0.036 -0.008 -0.044*** 
ROE 116 0.115 -0.008 -0.123*** 
ROS 116 0.003 -0.180 -0.183 
 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
Note: This table reports the significant decreases in mean profitability of China’s listed firms 
after their IPOs. The windows used for comparison are three years before and three years after 
the change-of-control year. If there are fewer years before or after the change-of-control year, 
then the actual number of years is used. Panel A reports the significant decreases in mean 
profitability, not benchmarked against the mean profitability of all listed firms, while Panel B 
reports the significant decreases in mean profitability, benchmarked against the median 
profitability of all listed firms. These results reconstruct the “profitability puzzle” as 
documented in the literature. 
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Table 4-6: Comparing Profitability before and after the IPO (“Profitability Puzzle” 
Reconstructed) 
 
Panel C. Median profitability changes (not benchmarked against median profitability of all 
listed firms) 
 
Variable Number of Firms Median Before Median After Difference 
ROA 116 0.095 0.059 -0.036*** 
ROE 116 0.210 0.111 -0.099*** 
ROS 116 0.162 0.125 -0.037*** 
 
 
Panel D. Median profitability changes (benchmarked against median profitability of all listed 
firms) 
 
Variable Number of Firms Median Before Median After Difference 
ROA 116 0.030 -0.003 -0.033 
ROE 116 0.085 -0.006 -0.091*** 
ROS 116 0.032 -0.005 -0.037*** 
 
***, denotes significance at the 1% level 
 
 
Note: This table reports the significant decreases in median profitability of China’s listed firms 
after their IPOs. The windows used for comparison are three years before and three years after 
the change-of-control year. If there are fewer years before or after the change-of-control year, 
then the actual number of years is used. Panel A reports the significant decreases in median 
profitability, not benchmarked against the median profitability of all listed firms, while Panel 
B reports the significant decreases in median profitability, benchmarked against the median 
profitability of all listed firms. These results reconstruct the “profitability puzzle” as 
documented in the literature. 
 
     d) The stock market response to change-of-control  
     How does the stock market respond to the change-of-control? In order to investigate this 
question, I have calculated the stock returns based on the following formula, which is used by 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) in their Journal of Finance paper, when they examine the 
stock returns to privatizations in Canada, France, Hungary, Japan, Malaysia, Poland, Thailand, 
and the U.K.: 
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          Pit=closing stock price of company i on day t following initial trade 
          Pi0=initial offer price for company i 
          ri=log(Pit)-log(Pi0)=raw, unadjusted return to company i  
          It=stock market index on day t 
   Io=stock market index on the date of the IPO It- Io 
          r*i=ri- [log(It)-log( Io)]=market-adjusted return to company i38 
     Using the above formula, I calculate the 3-calendar-day returns around the 
change-of-control (again, I use the change-of-control instead of the IPO as the defining event 
of “privatization”，and I use the Shanghai stock market index), and report the results in Table 
4-7. Table 4-7 shows that, even though the mean and median 3-day-returns after the 
change-of-control is still negative, they improve upon the mean and median 3-day-return 
before the change-of-control. It seems that investors do have some optimistic expectations at 
change-of-control.   
 
Table 4-7: Stock Performance Before and After the Change-of-Control 
 
Panel A. Mean and median return changes (not market-adjusted) 
 
Variable Number of Firms Before After Difference
Mean Return 116 -0.148 -0.140 0.008 
Median Return 116 -0.074 -0.067 0.007 
   
 
Note: This table reports the changes in mean and median stock returns of listed firms 3 
calendar days around their changes-of-control.  
 
 
 
                                                        
38 See P. 1665 in Dewenter and Malatesta: public offerings of state-owned and privately-owned 
enterprises: an international comparison, Journal of Finance, September 1997. 
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Table 4-7: Stock Performance Before and After the Change-of-Control 
 
Panel B. Mean and median return changes (market-adjusted) 
 
Variable Number of Firms Before After Difference
Mean Return 116 -0.147 -0.139 0.008 
Median Return 116 -0.095 -0.085 0.010 
 
 
Note: This table reports the changes in mean and median stock returns of listed firms 3 
calendar days around their changes-of-control.  
 
   e) The source of performance improvements: does corporate governance matter? 
      Barberis et al. (1996), Dyck (1997) and Frydman et al. (1999) all emphasize the crucial 
role of management turnovers in privatization. The improvement of corporate governance 
associated with the change-of-control is expected to be an important source of performance 
improvement. Figure 4-7 shows that, 56% of the privatized firms have changed the CEOs and 
59% of the privatized firms have changed Chairmen of the Board. In the majority of cases of 
management turnovers, the new Chairmen or CEOs came from outside the firm.  
 
Note:  CEO (in): The new CEO is from inside the firm 
CEO (out): The new CEO is from outside the firm 
      Chairman (in): The new Board Chairman is from inside the firm 
      Chairman (out): The new Board Chairman is from outside the firm 
Figure 4-7: The Percentages of Firms That Have Changed the Board Chairmen or CEOs 
CEO Turnover
CEO(in)
19%
CEO(out)
37%
No Change
44%
CEO(in)
CEO(out)
No Change
Board Chairman Turnover
Chairman(in)
17%
Chairman(out)
42%
No Change
41%
Chairman(in)
Chairman(out)
No Change
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     Bai et al. (2004) shows that corporate governance does affect the market valuation of 
firms in China. For example, they find that “high concentration of non-controlling 
shareholding” and “issuing shares to foreign investors” have positive effects on market 
valuation, while “a large holding by the largest shareholder”, “the CEO being the chairman or 
vice chairman of the board of directors”, and “the largest shareholder being the government” 
have negative effects. They focus on firms during a relatively short period, 1999—2001 and 
they use Tobin’s Q as the firm performance measure, which may not be a very good measure 
of firm performance for Chinese listed firms. This is because many shares in Chinese listed 
firms are non-tradable, and as a result, the stock price may exaggerate the actual value of the 
firm. Though some adjustments are made in Bai et al. (2004), those adjustments are arguably 
subjective. I extend their study to data from 1992—2003, and use ROA to measure firm 
performance to test if corporate governance improvements indeed account for profitability 
improvements in Chinese listed firms. 
     The panel random effect regression model generates the following results  
(White-robust standard errors are in the parentheses):                 
     ROAi,t= –0.743   +   0.076Privatei,t  –0.110CEOini,t +0.086CEOouti,t 
           (0.123)***    (0.015)***     (0.067)*      (0.052)* 
               
 
           +0.011Chairini,t   –0.168Chairouti,t +0.044log(Assets) i,t 
            (0.052)         (0.044)***      (0.006)*** 
               
           –0.999Leveragei,t + ti,ε       
            (0.025)***  
 
     R2=0.33, Number of Firms=983, Number of Observations=3616 
     * (***) denotes significance at 10% (1%) level 
            
     In this equation, Private is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is a privatized 
firm. If there is a management turnover, and the new CEO comes from inside the firm, then 
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CEOin equals one; if the new CEO comes from outside the firm, then CEOout equals one; if 
the new chairman of the board of directors comes from inside the firm, then Chairin equals 
one; if the new chairman of the board of directors comes from outside the firm, then Chairout 
equals one.  
     Obviously, privatized firms enjoy significantly higher profitability than SOEs, the firms 
with new CEOs from outside the firm enjoy higher profitability, while the firms with new 
CEOs from inside the firm suffer from lower profitability. These results are consistent with the 
results of Frydman et al. (1999), who show that, “in the context of transition economies in 
Central Europe, this means that privatization is effective in enhancing revenue and 
productivity performance of firms that come to be controlled by outsider-owners, but produces 
no significant effect in firms controlled by insiders.” (pp. 1186-1187). 
     These results are very relevant for current policy making in China. China started 
experimenting with highly controversial MBO (Management Buyout) programs in SOEs in 
1999. China Daily (2003) reports, “China's business press touted management buyouts (MBOs) 
throughout 2002. And they heralded 2003 as ‘the year of the MBO’.” However,  Dyck’s 
(1997) theoretical model in the American Economic Review regarding management selection 
and economic transition in Eastern German privatization shows, “privatization policies that 
discouraged management change or introduced owners without the ability to identify qualified 
western managers are likely to have significant opportunity costs. For example, Russia’s 
privatization policy gave incumbent management significant stakes. This shareholding 
increased managerial incentives, but by entrenching management made it very difficult to 
introduce the replacement of human capital that this paper suggests is critical to successful 
restructuring.” Neither the theoretical results of Dyck (1997) nor the empirical results of this 
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chapter support MBOs in China. In fact, after heated debates in China, in April 2005, in order 
to contain insider-control and state-owned assets losses, the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC) and the Ministry of Finance jointly issued a 
document forbidding MBOs in large-scale SOEs in China. However, in January 2006, the 
SASAC decided to permit MBOs in major SOEs again. The empirical results in this section do 
not support this latest policy.    
 
3. Related Literature 
     Due to the lack of unambiguous theoretical predictions in current privatization field, 
former researchers tend to focus their efforts on the empirical side. There are four major 
approaches of such empirical investigations, all of which identify the IPO of an SOE as the 
event that defines “privatization.” This chapter uses all four approaches, yet with a more 
accurate definition of “privatization”, it arguably produces more accurate results.           
     The first approach is to compare the relative performances of SOEs and private firms 
cross-sectionally. Dewenter and Malatesta’s (2001) univariate analysis of Fortune 500 firms 
(top 500 firms around the world) shows that, on average, SOEs have lower profitability, higher 
leverage, higher employment, and lower labor productivity. 39 Ehrich et al. (1994) study 23 
international airlines from 1973 to 1983 and show that “state ownership can lower the long-run 
annual rate of productivity growth or cost decline, but not necessarily their levels in the short 
run.” (p.1006) On the other hand, Caves and Christensen (1980) compare the postwar 
productivity performance of the Canadian National Railroad (state-owned) and Canadian 
Pacific Railroad (private) and find “no evidence of inferior performance by the 
                                                        
39 The higher leverage of the SOEs is due to their “soft budget constraints”, in contrast with 
the “hard budget constraints” of private firms. 
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government-owned railroad” (p. 958).  But their sample of only 2 firms naturally raises 
doubts about the representativeness of their results. 
     The second approach is to compare the performances of SOEs before IPOs and after 
IPOs (univariate event study approach). Megginson et al. (1994) use a three-year window (3 
years before and 3 years after the IPO) and show that mean and median profitability and 
productivity significantly improve after IPOs. They also find that mean and median leverage 
falls after IPOs. Surprisingly, they find that mean and median employment increase after 
IPOs. Following Megginson et al.’s (1994) pioneering work and using the same three-year 
window, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) study developing countries, D’Souza and Megginson 
(1999) study industrialized countries, and Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) study Fortune 
Global 500 firms. These three follow-up studies confirm most of Megginson et al. (1994)’s 
results. 
     The third approach is to study the effects of government ownership on SOE performance 
in a multivariate regression framework. Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) regress profitability 
and productivity on an SOE dummy and control variables, and they find that the SOE dummy 
is always negatively and significantly correlated with firm performance. They also regress the 
firm performance measures on the fraction of equity owned by the government and other 
control variables. They show that government ownership has negative and significant effects 
on profitability, positive and significant effects on leverage, and negative though insignificant 
effects on productivity. Gupta (2005) uses a similar approach to examine the effect of private 
ownership on the profitability and productivity of Indian SOEs and shows that private shares 
have positive and significant effects on all performance measures.  
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     In summary, the first three major approaches: cross-sectional univariate analysis, 
univariate event-study, and multivariate regression analysis all lead to similar results: private 
firms enjoy higher profitability and productivity than SOEs. Private firms also have lower 
leverage. But in terms of employment, some studies show that employment increases after 
IPOs, while other studies show the opposite case. My results about profitability and 
productivity are similar to these studies, but employment significantly declines after the 
changes of control as redundant workers get laid off. 
     The fourth approach is to examine the sources of performance improvements after 
privatization: “when does privatization work?” (Frydman et al. 1999) and “how does 
privatization work?” (Barberis et al. 1996). Both studies emphasize the importance of 
management turnovers in successful privatizations. Dyck (1997) emphasizes such importance 
in the context of Eastern Germany. My results show that in China, new CEOs from outside the 
privatized firms significantly improve firm performance. 
     Finally, using evidence from India, Gupta (2005) argues in her paper in Journal of 
Finance that partial privatization without changes of control has significantly improved firm 
performance in India. However, she uses “Sales” and “Profit” instead of ROA, ROE or ROS 
as the profitability measures. I use the summary statistics data in Table II of her paper and 
conduct an intuitive analysis and find that we may probably find that ROA and ROS fall after 
partial privatization in India. Here I reproduce part of her Table II: (“Sales”, “Profit”, and 
“Assets” are measured in logarithms):  
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Table 4-8: Firm Performance Before and After IPOs in India 
Variable Mean Before Mean After 
After-Before t-Statistic of 
Difference in Means 
Sales 5.815 7.061 7.577*** 
Profit 6.476 6.792 6.583*** 
Assets 5.417 6.724 7.702*** 
    
Source: Gupta, N. “Partial Privatization and Firm Performance.” Journal of Finance, 
April 2005, p. 997, Table II. 
 
Mean sales increase at a rate of e7.061-5.815 -1=e1.246-1=247.6%, and mean assets increase at a 
rate of e6.724-5.417-1=e1.307-1=269.5%, while mean profit increases at a rate of only  
e6.792-6.476 -1=e0.316-1=37.2%. Intuitively, “Sales” and “Assets” increase at a much faster rate 
than “Profit”, making ROS and ROA deteriorate after partial privatization. This reconstructs 
the “profitability puzzle” (as found in China) that profitability falls after partial privatization 
(IPO).  
 
4． Summary of Chapter 
This chapter analyzes the causes and effects of share issue privatization in China between 
1994 and 2003. It provides a solution to the “profitability puzzle.” This puzzle is that, in 
contrast with evidence from many other countries, China’s SOEs did not become more 
profitable after their IPOs. I argue that simply “going public” is not enough to ensure higher 
profitability. Rather, an actual “change of control” of a firm from the State to private owners is 
what really raises profitability and improves productivity by reducing excess labor. 
    Empirical test results from both univariate analysis and multivariate analysis strongly 
support the “change-of-control matters” hypothesis. The 116 listed firms that experienced 
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actual transfers of control by the end of 2002 enjoy higher profitability and productivity during 
the post-change years than pre-change years, and for any given sample year they enjoy higher 
profitability and productivity than SOEs (or more accurately, state-controlled enterprises). 
Even after controlling for other factors affecting the profitability of firms and controlling for 
endogeneity by using two-stage-least-squares technique, the “change-of-control” still 
significantly contributes to improvements in profitability. Meanwhile, redundant employment 
within SOEs is reduced in the post-change-of-control years. The stock market seems to 
respond positively to the change-of-control. My analysis also investigates the sources of firm 
performance improvements and finds that the improvements in corporate governance, 
especially the management turnovers associated with the changes of control, are significantly 
associated with firm performance improvements. This result seems not to support the current 
policy that allows Management Buyout (MBO) in China’s SOEs. 
    An important future research direction is to empirically disentangle the effects of 
intensified competition and change-of-control on firm profitability. Bartel and Harrison (2005) 
disentangle the effects of privatization and competition in the context of Indonesia, and a 
similar study can be conducted for China, as reliable data on Chinese firm competition become 
available in the future.  
    The empirical results in this chapter strongly support the theoretical results of chapter III 
that “change-of-control” matters. These results show that the share issue privatization has 
“worked” in China, and China should continue its privatization of SOEs so as to fully reap the 
fruits of economic reforms.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
This dissertation focuses on two important issues in China’s economic growth and 
structural reforms: (1) the relationship between financial development and economic growth; 
(2) the effects of share issue privatization. The first issue has been widely recognized as a 
crucial element for long-run growth in China, while the latter issue has been the core of 
China’s economic reforms.  
Chapter II examines the relationship between China’s financial development and 
economic growth. Financial development is measured by bank credit and stock market size or 
trading volume, while economic growth is measured by GDP or fixed investment. This chapter 
uses standard VAR techniques to disentangle the causal relationship between those variables 
(in the sense of Granger-causality). Results from tri-variate VAR estimations show that while 
banking sector development promotes economic growth in China, stock market development 
has not yet played an identifiable role in China’s economic growth. This may be due to 
improvements in China’s banking sector and the persistent problems with China’s stock 
markets, such as illiquidity as well as fraud and insider trading. Chapter II represents one of 
the first studies that use multivariate VAR methods to study the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in China. 
Chapter III establishes a stylized theoretical model to analyze the causes and effects of 
share issue privatization in China. This model studies a sequential game between Chinese 
government and firms, which shows the “grabbing hand” and “helping hand” aspects of the 
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Chinese government when it intervenes into firms’ management. This model, with its realistic 
setup and weak assumptions, predicts that privatization will unambiguously improve firm 
profitability and labor productivity as redundant workers get laid off. Chapter III sets up one of 
the first practical models of share issue privatization that generates results consistent with the 
extensive empirical evidence from developing and developed countries in the literature.    
Chapter IV uses two newly available datasets and empirically tests the theoretical 
predictions of Chapter III. It is motivated by the “profitability puzzle”, i.e., in sharp contrast to 
extensive evidence from other countries, China’s state-owned enterprises did not become more 
profitable after their IPOs. This chapter argues that the change-of-control, rather than the IPO, 
should be the event that defines “privatization.” This chapter uses the change of the largest 
shareholder from the State to a private owner as the definition of “privatization”, and confirms 
my theoretical prediction that after privatization, Chinese firms become more profitable and 
productive as redundant workers get laid off. The univariate time-series comparison of 
profitability and productivity before and after privatization shows that the firms improve 
profitability and productivity after privatization. The univariate cross-sectional comparison of 
the profitability of privatized firms and state-owned enterprises shows that privatized firms 
have higher profitability than state-owned enterprises for the majority of sample years, though 
the state-owned enterprises did catch up with privatized firms by the end of the sample period. 
The multivariate regression using panel data generates similar results, even after controlling 
for endogeneity with two-stage-least-squares technique. The stock market seems to respond 
positively to privatization. Finally, this chapter investigates how management turnovers 
associated with privatization affect firm profitability. The results show that new CEOs from 
outside the firm instead of inside the firm seem to have positive effects on firm profitability. 
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This chapter proposes a new definition of “privatization”, which is arguably more accurate 
than previous empirical identifications in the literature, and as a result, it leads to more 
accurate estimations of the effects of privatization in China and solves the “profitability 
puzzle” that has troubled researchers for many years.  
The results in this dissertation have several key policy implications: 
 (1) China should take full advantage of its under-utilized stock markets to promote 
economic growth. Many structural reforms, including gradually selling off the non-tradable 
state shares, and enforcing stronger laws and regulations to punish fraud and insider trading, 
should be carried out in order to achieve this goal; 
 (2) China should continue its share issue privatization. The “profitability puzzle” has been 
used by some to argue that China’s privatization programs failed. This dissertation uses a 
better definition of “privatization” and refutes that argument by rigorous theoretical and 
empirical analyses. This dissertation shows that privatization has indeed “worked” in China in 
the sense that it improves firm profitability and labor productivity as well as reducing excess 
labor.  
China has risen to a major world player during the past two decades, and it has 
contributed significantly to world economic growth. It is crucial at this moment to ponder the 
successes and failures of China’s economic reform and learn lessons from it so that the next 
steps of China’s reforms and development will remain steady and fast. 
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